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INTRODUCTION
What does it mean to "sell" a financial asset? The answer has confounded courts and commentators for some time. The question has taken
on increased importance with the rise of the securitization industry. A
financial asset is a right to payment of money. Examples include trade
receivables (rights to payment for goods sold or services rendered), lease
rentals, mortgage and other loans, license and franchise fees, and any other
legal or contractual right to payment. l
Transfers of financial assets in which the parties state that they intend
a sale, and in which all the benefits and risks commonly associated with
ownership are transferred for fair value in an arm's-length transaction, are
easily identifiable as sales. The issue becomes complicated if the buyer
retains recourse to the seller such that less than all of the risks of ownership
are transferred. In that case, an issue can arise over whether to view the
transaction as a sale or a secured loan. But why?
Under contract law, parties generally are free to enter into and enforce
any contract that is not illegal or against public policy; there is nothing
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about recourse, for example, that either is illegal or in violation of public
policy. Common law favors the free transfer of rights to receive money
where there are no significant externalities that have consequences to third
parties. 2 There is no legal or public policy which precludes a transferor
from improving the value of an asset sold by adding its own guarantee.
When a financial asset represented by a check or other draft is transferred,
recourse is the common, accepted, and sometimes mandatory consequence of transfer. Indorsement with recourse has never been viewed as
precluding the existence of a sale.
A seller might agree to some kind of recourse because it wants the
benefits of the sale and is prepared to incur recourse in order to induce
someone to buy the asset. The most common example is the sale of goods
backed by warranties. The Official Comments to the UC.C. recognize
that "there may be a true sale of accounts, [or] chattel paper ... although
recourse exists."3
The complication arises most often when a buyer of a financial asset
attempts to enforce or has to defend its ownership rights to an asset in the
seller's subsequent bankruptcy case. 4 In bankruptcy, for example, if the
sale were treated as a sale, the buyer would e~oy greater rights and privileges than if the sale were treated as a loan. The asset would belong to the
buyer. It would not be part of the seller's bankruptcy estate, and the buyer
would not have to worry about the automatic stay, turnover, or any interference with its property rights. This result is good for the buyer, but some
might argue that it damages the debtor's chances for rehabilitation and
creditors' expectations of equal treatment. Because of this tension between
the buyer's interest and those of the debtor and its creditors, recharacterization issues often arise in bankruptcy cases. When they do, they appear
largely to turn on whether the existence of recourse turns a "sale" into a
"loan. "
But if, as the UC.C. comment states, there may be a true sale even with
recourse, then under what circumstances should a bankruptcy court recharacterize a sale as a loan? Furthermore, is it a question of state law,
federal law, or both?
2. The Uniform Commercial Code (V.C.C.) declares "ineffective" any contract term that
"prohibits assignment of an account." UC.C. § 9-318(4) (1995); see UC.C. § 9-318 cmt. 4
(1995), which notes that this provision
states a rule of law which is widely recognized in the cases and which corresponds to
current business practices. It can be regarded as a revolutionary departure only by those
who still cherish the hope that we may yet return to the views entertained some two
hundred years ago by the Court of King's Bench.

See also PEB Commentary No. 14 Gune 10, 1994).
3. UC.C. § 9-502 cmt. 4 (1995). The UC.C., with limited exceptions, applies to the sale
of accounts. /d. § 9-1 02(b).
4. True sale issues continue to arise in usury cases as well. See People v. Service Inst., Inc.,
421 N.YS.2d 325 (Sup. Ct. 1979).
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The authors of this Article try to answer these questions by rethinking
the role of recourse in the sale of financial assets. The concept of "true
sale" is profoundly significant in today's commercial world. Defining true
sale is the holy grail of the securitization market, a market in which hundreds of billions of dollars flow in transactions structured around constantly
evolving ideas of what true sale means. In structuring true sale transactions,
tension often arises between the desire for a certain amount of recourse
and the belief that "too much" recourse will prevent true sale treatment. 5
There is no single case that presents a comprehensive theory of the effect
of recourse in a true sale. Little thought has been given, for example, to
the competing policy issues of balancing the need for clarity, fairness, and
simplicity in commercial transactions 6 with those bankruptcy law policies
that may be affected by treating a transfer with recourse as a sale rather
than a loan. Yet, sale characterization has important consequences.
If the transfer of the future payment stream from the originator
[seller] to the third party [purchaser] fails to constitute a true sale
under § 541 of the Bankruptcy Code, the transfer would be deemed
an advance of funds by the third party to the originator secured by
the payment stream, i.e., a secured loan. The third party would then
be a creditor of the originator and have a security interest, but not
an ownership interest, in the payment stream. In such a case, the
originator's bankruptcy would, under § 362 of the Bankruptcy Code,
automatically result in a stay of all actions by creditors to foreclose
on or otherwise obtain property of the originator. The third party
may not be able to obtain payments collected on the payment stream
until the stay is modified. Further, under § 363 of the Bankruptcy
Code, a court, after notice to creditors and the opportunity of a hearing, could order the cash collections of the payment stream to be used
by the originator in its business as working capital if the originator or
its trustee in bankruptcy provides adequate protection for the interest
of the third party in the payment stream. ''Adequate protection,"
though, does not always translate into an alternative cash source.
5. See Thomas E. Plank, The True Sale r!f Loans and the Role r!f Recourse, 14 GEO. MASON L.
REV. 287, 306-07 (1991). Concerns over recourse and its effect on true sale treatment have
caused one rating agency to say that in certain structured financings there "should be no
recourse against the seller for defaulted receivables beyond a reasonably anticipated default
rate based upon historical analysis." STANDARD & POOR'S CORPORATION, STRUCTURED
FINANCE CRITERIA 69 (1988). When the authors refer to "recourse," they mean not only
contractual recourse but also any type of credit support the seller may provide to the buyer.
For example, a seller that retains a subordinated interest in the financial asset it sells as part
of the consideration it receives in the sale provides the buyer with recourse to the extent of
the subordinated interest. Any loss suffered, if the asset fails to collect, is suffered first by the
seller to the extent of its retained subordinated interest.
6. See International Trade Admin. v. Rensselaer Polytechnic Inst., 936 F.2d 744, 751 (2d
Cir. 1991); Steven L. Schwarcz, A Fundamental Inquiry Into the Statutory Rulemaking Process r!f
Private Legislatures, 29 GA. L. REV. 909 (1995).
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In addition, § 364 of the Bankruptcy Code also would permit the
originator, if credit is not otherwise available to it and if adequate
protection is given to the third party, to raise cash by granting to new
lenders a lien that is either pari passu with that of the third party, or
if a pari passu lien cannot attract new financing, a lien having priority
over the third party's lien. 7

Because the law fails to define clearly the effect of recourse in a sale,
virtually all of the securitization transactions that involve noninvestment
grade originators or the issuance of publicly traded securities require a
two-tier structure to avoid the risk that recourse might disqualify true sale
treatment for a transfer. s
In this Article, the authors analyze the caselaw and define, in their view,
the consequences of the presence of recourse in sales of financial assets.
The analysis in this Article assumes an arm's-length transaction in which
the buyer has taken all requisite steps to perfect its interest in the asset it
buys.9 The authors conclude that:
(i) A distinction in law can be made between two types of recourse,
7. Steven L. Schwarcz, The Parts Are Greater than the Whole: How Securitization qf Diuisible
Interests Can Revolutionize Structured Finance and Open the Capital Markets to Middle-Market Companies,
1993 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 139, 144 n.16.
8. A two-tier structure is a way of resolving the conflict between the high recourse level,
or overcollateralization, desired by investors and the economic goal that excess collections
be returned to the seller:
If the originator is not investment grade, a sale for bankruptcy purposes will be required
to protect investors from the risks associated with the originator's possible bankruptcy.
This bankruptcy risk can be avoided, while minimizing the cost of overcollateralization,
by structuring the securitization transaction with two SPVs [special purpose vehicles]
in a two tier structure, also known as "FINCO" (finance company) structure. Under
this method, the originator first sells receivables to a wholly owned SPY in a transaction
that constitutes a true sale for bankruptcy purposes and thus achieves bankruptcy protection. The wholly owned SPY then transfers its receivables to an independent Spy
in a transaction that constitutes a sale for accounting purposes but not necessarily for
bankruptcy purposes. The independent Spy issues securities in the capital markets to
fund the transfer. After the independent Spy pays off the securities, it can reconvey the
remaining receivables and collections to the wholly owned SPY without impairing the
accounting characterization as a sale. The wholly owned SPY is then merged into the
originator, or alternatively, the remaining receivables and collections are transferred
back to the originator, as dividends. This structure thus allows the originator to realize
the value of any excess receivables and collections created by the original overcollateralization.
Steven L. Schwarcz, The Alchemy qfAsset Securitization, I STANFORD J.L. Bus. & FIN. 133, 142
(1994) (footnotes omitted).
9. In addition to the perfection rules of UC.C. Article 9, which generally apply to sales
of accounts and chattel paper, other state perfection laws might apply to sales of other kinds
of personal property. See Thomas E. Plank, Sacred Cows and Workhorses: The Sale qfAccounts and
Chattel Paper Under the U C. C. and the E;fficts qf Violating a Fundamental Drafling Principle, 26 CONN.
L. REV. 397 (1994); see also infta note 66.
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which are identified by this Article as recourse for collectibility
and economic recourse. Recourse for collectibility is the equivalent of warranting that the asset will perform in accordance with
its terms. Economic recourse is the equivalent of warranting a
return to the buyer of its investment plus an agreed upon yield
unrelated to the asset's payment terms. As a matter of state law,
the transfer of a financial asset in an arm's-length transaction
should be treated as a sale if the parties so state, even if the buyer
retains partial or full recourse for collectibility against the seller.
If the buyer retains economic recourse against the seller, however,
the transaction is susceptible to recharacterization as a loan. The
rationale underlying the case law is that when recourse relates
only to the quality of the asset being sold, that type of recourse is
consistent with a sale (similar to a warranty on sale); but when
the recourse goes beyond the quality of the asset and ensures an
economic rate of return to the purported buyer that is unrelated
to the payment terms of the underlying asset, the asset serves
merely as collateral and the transaction is susceptible to being
recharacterized as a loan.
(ii) A sale under state law should be treated as a sale in bankruptcy,
even if the buyer has partial or full recourse for collectibility
against the seller. Although bankruptcy policies may require a
bankruptcy court to determine independently whether recharacterization is appropriate, state law principles of recharacterization must govern the analysis. The U.S. Supreme Court has
specifically found that following state contract law is necessary to
reduce uncertainty by treating interests uniformly within a state
and to prevent a party from receiving a windfall by the happenstance of bankruptcy.lo State law is determinative of contractual
rights when the contract for the sale of financial assets is formed,
and to preempt state law by reason of the occurrence of a bankruptcy upsets the economic bargain reached between the parties.
This Article then applies these principles to a variety of transaction
structures that are used, or potentially useful, in the marketplace. It illustrates that, in many cases involving the sale of financial assets, a true sale
determination can be made even if the buyer were to have full or partial
recourse to the seller for collectibility.

DISCUSSION
THE ROLE OF RECOURSE IN TRUE SALES
Although the cases involving sales of financial assets with recourse are
not uniform, a significant number of them support the hypothesis that the
10. Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979).
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difference between sale and loan characterization is the difference between
recourse for collectibility and economic recourse.

Reconciling the Role of Recourse in True Sales
Recharacterization cases are centuries old. I I They illustrate that the law
may not treat a transaction as a sale just because the buyer and seller
labeled it a sale. If the buyer later attempts to enforce its rights as a buyer
and someone (usually the seller or its creditors) then challenges the sale as
a loan, a court, under certain circumstances, could recharacterize the sale
as a loan.
Generally, the party seeking recharacterization had to prove two things
in order to prevail. First, it had to prove that recharacterization was necessary to avoid a result that would otherwise be illegal or violate public
policy. Usury was a favorite charge of those seeking recharacterization. 12
Grant Gilmore also suggests that recharacterization was used most often
against transactions that were called sales in order to evade state or local
recording requirements or compliance with "long-drawn-out, expensive
and uncertain foreclosure proceedings." 13 On occasion, a transferor would
seek to recharacterize a sale as a loan in order to recover the surplus above
the purchase price plus interest that the transferee of the asset had collected. 14
Second, the challenging party had to establish that the transaction was,
in substance, intended to be a loan even if it took the form of a sale.
Although the courts considered a number of factors to determine the parties' true intentions and whether to recharacterize, the underlying reason
for loan recharacterization was that the buyer's interest in the transaction
did not sufficiently reflect the characteristics of ownership. Often courts
would recharacterize because the transferee's interest in the asset was limited to its investment plus a predetermined rate of return, with all surplus
II. GRANT GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 2.6, at 47
(1965).
12. Annotation, When Tranifer if Accounts or Other Choses in Action is Deemed a Sale Rather than
a Pledge as SecurityJor a Loan and Vice Versa, 95 A.L.R. 1197 (1935). See Le Sueur v. Manufacturers' Fin. Co., 285 F. 490 (6th Cir. 1922); National Discount Co. v. Evans (In re Hitt Lumber
& Box Co.), 272 F. 570 (6th Cir. 1921); Commercial Sec. Co. v. Holcombe (In re E.E. Forbes
Piano Co.), 262 F. 657 (5th Cir. 1920); West Pico Furniture Co. v. Pacific Fin. Loans, 469
P.2d 665 (Cal. 1970); Dorothy v. Commonwealth Commercial Co., 116 N.E. 143 (Ill. 1917);
Mercantile Trust Co. v. Kastor, 112 N.E. 988 (Ill. 1916); Kelter v. American Bankers' Fin.
Co., 160 A. 127 (pa. 1932).
13. GIl.MORE, supra note II, § 2.6, at 49.
14. Major's Furniture Mart, Inc. v. Castle Credit Corp., 602 F.2d 538 (3d Cir. 1979); Isaak
v. Journey, 15 F.2d 1069 (Idaho 1932). The issue at stake in these kinds of cases is reflected
in U.C.C. § 9-502(2) (1995), which mandates that if a transfer is for security, as opposed to
an outright sale, the transferee "must account to the debtor for any surplus." Id.
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going to the transferor. IS This arrangement obviously indicated something
other than a true sale of the benefits of ownership.
For instance, in Home Bond Co. v. McChesney,16 the Supreme Court affirmed a decision to recharacterize a sale of accounts as a loan. The Supreme Court emphasized the fact that the ownership in the accounts was
not transferred because the buyer only acquired the right to recover from
the proceeds of the accounts the amount it had advanced plus a predetermined rate of interest. 17 The buyer had recourse to the seller if an
account debtor defaulted, but recourse was limited to the amount paid for
the account plus interest, and not the face amount of the account. 18 On
the other hand, in Chase & Baker Co. v. National Trust & Credit CO.,19 the fact
that the seller was obligated to repurchase defaulted accounts at their face
value, and not just for the amount paid by the buyer plus interest, indicated
to the court that the parties intended a sale. 2o
In virtually all of the recharacterization cases, including those in which
the fight was over which party was entitled to the surplus, the nature of
the buyer's recourse to the seller became the key issue in the debate over
whether the transfer was a sale or a loan. 21
An example is in In re Grand Union Co.,22 in which a company "sold"
certain leases with recourse to a credit company. The court acknowledged
"[t]he fact that the bankrupt guaranteed payment of principal and interest
15. Typically, the rate of return was also unrelated to the return implied by the payment
terms of the transferred asset. As discussed below, this also was relevant to the issue of whether
the presence of recourse prevented true sale treatment. See infta text accompanying notes 3840.
16. 239 U.S. 568 (1916).
17. Id. at 575; see Sponge Exch. Bank v. Commercial Credit Co., 263 F. 20 (5th Cir. 1920).
The court stated:
When by the terms of a transaction by which an indorsee acquires a note he is required
to pay, or account to the indorser for, so much of what is collected on it as is in excess
of an amount advanced and agreed interest thereon, the transaction is not a sale of the
note, and the indorsee is not the buyer of it.

Id. at 25; Comm~cial Sec. Co., 262 F. at 661 (entitling debtor to collections on sold accounts in
excess of buyer's stipulated rate of return); Dorothy, 116 N.E. at 149 (" [I]f an account ...
discounted for four months or for a year was paid in one month, it was treated as a onemonth account, and adjusted accordingly in the settlement between the two companies.");
Kel~, 160 A. at 130 ("On profitable contracts a balance was paid by the so-called 'buyer' of
the contract to the alleged 'seller.' "); see also Annotation, When Transf~ qf Accounts or Oth~
Chases in Action Is Deemed a Sale Rath~ Than a Pledge as Securityfor a Loan and Vice Vma, 95 A.L.R.
1197 (1935), and cases cited therein.
18. Home Bond, 239 U.S. at 575; see National Discount Co. v. Evans, 272 F. 570, 573-74
(6th Cir. 1921) (holding repurchase obligation limited to amount advanced by buyer, plus
interest).
19. 215 F. 633 (N.D. Ill. 1914).
20. /d. at 638-39.
21. See supra note 12, and cases cited therein.
22. 219 F. 353 (2d Cir. 1914).
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as well as leases 'purchased' ... does not, standing alone, convert the sale
... into a 10an."23 The court nevertheless recharacterized the sale as a
loan because the seller, among other things, not only guaranteed collectibility, but "made itself responsible for every conceivable loss" and guaranteed the buyer's rate of return regardless of what payments either were
called for or collected under the lease. 24 The Third Circuit, more than
sixty years later, had a similar reaction in Major's Furniture Mart, Inc. v. Castle
Credit Corp.:25
Castle required Major's to retain all conceivable risks of uncollectibility of these accounts. It required ... that Major's warrant that the
accounts were ... "fully and timely collectible" [and there was an
obligation to repurchase any account sixty days overdue]. Guaranties
qf quality alone, or even guarantees qf collectibility alone, might be consistent with
a true sale, but Castle attempted to shift all risks to Major's, and incur none qf
the risks or obligations qf ownership. 26
Although recharacterization cases, like Major's Furniture Mart and Grand
Union, acknowledged that there could be a true sale with recourse,27 they
failed to address the circumstances under which recourse would not jeopardize true sale treatment. In other cases, courts have held sales with recourse to the seller to be true sales. In those cases, however, the seller
typically guarantees that the asset will perform (i.e., collect) as warranted
and remains contingently liable for collection risk if it does not. 28
For example, in Coast Finance Corp. v. Ira R Powers Furniture CO.,29 the court
upheld a sale in which the plaintiff, Coast, paid the defendant, Powers,
$100 in exchange for "the first $109.91 ofa certain conditional sales contract."30 At the time of sale, a balance of$282.63, payable in ten monthly
installments, remained unpaid. Powers, the seller, warranted that the contract was "genuine and that the balance represented is unpaid and not
subject to offset or counterclaim,"31 and also guaranteed payment of the
outstanding amount in accordance with the contract. When Powers later
refused to remit collections to Coast, Coast sued. Powers claimed that the
23. Id. at 361.
24. /d. at 361-62.
25. 602 F.2d 538 (3d Cir. 1979).
26. /d. at 545 (emphasis added). The Third Circuit, in affirming the lower court's decision
to recharacterize, also emphasized the fact that if Major's defaulted under its agreement with
the "buyer" or went out of business, "Major's was required to repurchase all outstanding
accounts immediately" without regard to performance by the account debtors. Id. at 541; see
In re Lendvest Mortgage, Inc., 119 B.R. 199, 200-01 (B.A.p. 9th Cir. 1990) (stating that the
assignor "guaranteed that the [assignee] would have no loss at all" and applying state law).
27. See also UC.C. § 9-502 cmt. 4 (I995).
28. See Nebraska Dep't of Revenue v. Loewenstein, 115 S. Ct. 557, 563 (1994).
29. 209 P. 614 (Or. 1922).
30. /d. at 614.
31. Id. at 615.
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transaction was a loan, not a sale, and argued that the payment to Coast
of $lO9.91 for a $lOO loan would be usurious. The court refused to recharacterize the sale as a loan stating:
When the holder of an instrument, such as the conditional sales contract held by defendant, transfers the instrument at a discount and is
required to indorse or otherwise guarantee it so that the vendor becomes liable contingently to pay the purchaser at a future day a sum
greater than that received with legal interest, the authorities present
different views. The great weight if authority is that such a transaction should
be regarded as a valid sale if a chattel with a warranty if soundness and the
purchaser is allowed to eriforce the obligation to its foil extent against his own
indorser and all prior parties.
It appears that plaintiff was in the business of discounting contracts
and commercial paper. From the facts stated in defendant's answer
quoted above, and the stipulation as to the position of the plaintiff
and the defendant, the court was warranted in finding that the assignment of the conditional sales contract, in consideration of the sum
of $100, was a bona fide sale of an interest in the contract. Any
contrary holding would clog the wheels of commerce. As far as the
record shows, the transaction did not constitute a loan; there was no
understanding between the parties that defendant should return the
money to plaintiff, except in the contingency that the original promisor ... should make default in payment; and it was a pure bargain
and sale of an interest in the contract, and no rate of interest was
agreed upon. As far as shown, the sale was made in entire good faith,
and there was no corrupt intent to exact a usurious rate ofinterest. 32
Other courts have likewise ruled that a sale with recourse solely for
collectibility to the seller is still a sale. 33 The difference between cases like
32. Id. at 615-16 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
33. See General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Mid-West Chevrolet Co., 66 F.2d I (10th
Cir. 1933). The court stated that
[b]efore there can be usury, there must be a loan. A loan of money involves an absolute
agreement to return the sum borrowed at a future time. No usury can attach to a bona
fide sale of property, tangible or intangible, even though it is accompanied by an agreement of the seller to indemnifY the buyer against loss.
/d. at 4-5; see also Investors Thrift v. AMA Corp., 255 Cal. App. 2d 205, 208 (Cal. Ct. App.

1967) (citing case law to the effect that "a guarantee of the validity of accounts implemented
by an agreement to repurchase 'uncollectible or disputed accounts' did not, per se, render
the transaction a loan"); Advance Indus. Fin. Co. v. Western Equities, Inc., 343 P.2d 408,
413 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959) (holding accounts sold with recourse "w[ere] a real purchase, not
a loan"); Refinance Corp. v. Northern Lumber Sales, 329 P.2d 109, 113 (Cal. Ct. App. 1958)
(same); Indian Lake Estates, Inc. v. Special Invs., Inc., 154 So. 2d 883, 891 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1963) (citing several cases, including Coast, in concluding that an assignment of "installment sales contracts ... is regarded as a sale, not a loan, despite a provision for recourse
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Grand Union and Mqjor's Furniture Mart on the one hand, and Coast Finance
on the other hand, seems to be the nature of the recourse involved. Most
of the cases in which the courts recharacterized a purported sale as a loan
involved the sale of accounts not represented by instruments or chattel
paper. 34 In a typical transaction, the "buyer" would purchase receivables
at a discount from face value and hold back some portion of the purchase
price as a "reserve." Although the discount might vary with the age of the
or guaranty"); State Bank v. Northwestern Sec. Co., 199 N.W. 240 (Minn. 1924) (note sold
at a discount with guaranty of "payment when due of each and every installment ... [of]
each and every note" deemed a sale, not a loan); General Motors Acceptance Corp. v.
Weinrich, 262 S.w. 425 (Mo. Ct. App. 1924) (commercial payer sold at a discount with
guaranty of "payment when due of each and every installment ... [of] each and every note"
deemed a sale, not a loan); A.B. Lewis Co. v. National Inv. Corp., 421 S.W.2d 723 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1967), where the court explained that:
[t]he fact is, however, that the language ... 'with full recourse' was to impose a contingent obligation on appellant to pay the amount of the sales contract if the buyer of the
automobile did not do so. Such an obligation is not inconsistent with a sale of the
contract rather than a pledge to secure a loan.

Id. at 728; Starker v. Heckart, 267 P.2d 219 (Or. 1954) (following Coast Finance); Martin v.
McAvoy, 228 P. 694 (Wash. 1924); see irifra note 45 and cases cited therein.
34. Some courts have gone so far as to try to reconcile cases that differ on whether recourse
affects true sale by creating a distinction between sales of ordinary accounts receivable Qoan)
and sales of installment paper or other instruments (sale). See, e.g., Indian Lake Estates, 154 So.
2d at 891 ("It should be emphasized that the agreements here do not involve ordinary
accounts receivable, but the sale oflot purchase installment contracts. A transfer at a discount
of installment sales contracts ... is regarded as a sale, not a loan, despite a provision for
recourse or guaranty. "). Apart from whether this distinction makes sense as a matter of law,
it does not exist as a matter of fact. Although most cases in which sales have been recharacterized as loans involved accounts, assignments with recourse of installment contracts have
been recharacterized as loans. See, e.g., Major's Furniture Mart, Inc. v. Castle Credit Corp.,
602 E2d 538 (3d Cir. 1979); In re Grand Union Co., 219 E 353 (2d Cir. 1914); Dorothy v.
Commonwealth Commercial Co., 116 N.£. 143 (Ill. 1917). Sales of ordinary accounts with
recourse also have been treated as true sales. See, e.g., Chase & Baker Co. v. National Trust
& Co., 215 E 633 (N.D. Ill. 1914); Investors Thrift v. AMA Corp., 255 Cal. App. 2d 205
(Cal. Ct. App. 1967); Advance Indus. Fin. Co. v. Western Equities, Inc., 343 P.2d 408 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1959). Moreover, the reason most of the cases involved accounts was not because
of any particular law or policy about recharacterization that was unique to accounts. A major
reason most of the cases involved ordinary accounts receivable was because many of the
cases were decided before the promulgation of the U.C.C. Under the U.C.C., procedures
were established which generally assured that perfection of a transfer of interests in ordinary
accounts receivable would survive a challenge under the "strong-arm" power found in § 70(c)
of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 (§ 544(a) of the Bankruptcy Code). Under laws which predated
the U.C.C., it was problematic whether a creditor could sufficiently perfect its interest in
undocumented receivables so as to obtain priority in the event the debtor filed for bankruptcy.
As a result, the effect of recharacterizing a sale of an account as a loan was significant. The
transferee went from having ownership of the account to mere standing as a general unsecured creditor. These high stakes encouraged litigation and gave rise to the large number of
reported decisions concerning sales of accounts. Today, the consequences of recharacterization to a buyer who has properly perfected its interest in the sold accounts is not nearly as
dramatic. See infta text accompanying note 103.
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account to reflect risk, often the discount did not attempt to compensate
the buyer completely for the time value of money. 35 Additional compensation for the time value of money-the buyer's yield-was determined
in advance and paid as interest either directly36 or disguised as a "service
charge" in order to avoid usury laws. 37 More important, however, recourse
for the buyer's return was fixed, calculated in advance, at a rate unrelated
to the payment terms of the underlying asset. 38
35. This is evident from the fact that the buyer would often charge the same discount for
accounts that could be expected to collect at different times. For instance, in Grand Union, the
buyer applied the same discount to receivables that were expected to collect at different
times. See Grand Union, 219 F. at 360.
36. See id. at 360 (interest payable by seller at six percent per annum).
37. See Merchants' Transfer & Storage Co. v. Rafferty (In re Gotham Can Co.), 48 F.2d
540 (2d Cir. 1931) (noting seller paid "service charge" of one percent per day upon outstanding balance of accounts); Brierley v. Commercial Credit Co., 43 F.2d 724 (E.D. Pa. 1929),
qff'd, 43 F.2d 730 (3d Cir. 1930) (same); see also National Discount Co. v. Evans, 272 F. 570,
573 (6th Cir. 1921) (noting charge of one percent per month on face value of purchased
accounts for "services rendered").
38. In many cases, the absence of a relationship between recourse for the buyer's return
and the return implied by the asset's terms was obvious. See Commercial Sec. v. Holcombe,
262 F. 657, 661-62 (5th Cir. 1920), stating that:
a transfer of paper evidencing indebtedness payable after the date of the transfer, and
which does not include any interest, is not a sale, is quite obvious, when the transferor
is required to pay to the transferee interest on the amount owing on such paper before
anything is payable by the maker, and the transferor has the right to reacquire the paper
by paying to the transferee the sum it calls for with interest thereon.

See also Mqjor's Furniture Mart, 602 F.2d at 546 (unilateral imposition of floating interest rate
on price term of the agreement "treated the transaction as ... a loan situation"); Grand Union,
219 F. at 360 (Grand Union was "paying interest to the Hamilton Investment Company at
the rate of 6 percent per annum, although the leases themselves bore no interest"); Ryan v.
Zinker (In re Sprint Mortgage Bankers Corp.), 164 B.R. 224 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y 1994), qff'd,
177 B.R. 4, 25 U.C.C. Rep. Servo 2d 1267 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y 1995). The court noted that:
a guaranteed rate of return was promised, as well as a specific date of return of all funds
one (I) year from the date of the investment. The one year maturity date was often in
advance of the maturity date of the mortgage, and was not the same date as the last
due date on the mortgage.

/d. at 226; European Am. Bank V. Sackman Mortgage Corp. (In re Sackman Mortgage Corp.),
158 B.R. 926, 935 (Bankr. S.D.NY 1993) (interest rate guaranteed to participant by assignor
calculated differently than rate payable by underlying obligor); Ables V. Major Funding Corp.
(In re Major Funding Corp.), 82 B.R. 443, 448 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1987) ("The investors were
promised a set return on their investment regardless of the rate on the 'assigned note.' ");
Castle Rock Indus. Bank V. S.O.A.W Enter., Inc. (In re S.0.A.W Enter., Inc.), 32 B.R. 279,
282-83 (Bankr. WD. Tex. 1983) (holding 30% "participation" in debtor/assignor's real property sales contracts deemed a loan where rate of return to the participant was unrelated to
the return under the contract and where the debtor and its president "personally guaranteed
the return to [the participant] of its investment and guaranteed the interest to be generated
by [its] investment").
Evidence that the recourse for buyer's return was unrelated to the payment terms of the
underlying asset was obvious from the fact that the discounted purchase price for the pur-
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Recourse for the buyer's return in these cases was unrelated to the
payment terms of the underlying asset. The buyer's recourse to the seller,
therefore, had nothing to do with collectibility. Recourse for collectibility
creates a contingent obligation to pay only if the underlying obligor defaults. 39 In most of the recharacterization cases, the buyer's recourse for
its return was not conditioned upon default, but upon the mere passage
of time. The buyer's return was predetermined, unrelated to the return
earned on the underlying asset, and usually not affected by an increase in
the value of the asset that might arise were the asset to collect sooner than
expected. The obvious consequence of all of this was made clear in the
following illustration by the court in Dorothy v. Commonwealth Commercial: 4o
For instance, if an account or piano contract which was discounted
for four months or for a year was paid in one month, it was treated
as a one-month account, and adjusted accordingly in the settlement
between the two companies. On the other hand, if a four-months
account ran over four months, it was adjusted on the advanced basis,
thus indicating that it was the intention that the [seller] should be
charged for the money loaned to it for the time it used the money.41
In cases like Coast Financial, recourse was only for collectibility. The buyer
purchased the asset at a discount calculated to reflect the buyer's return
based upon the payment terms of the asset. If the asset failed to perform
as warranted, the seller paid. If the payment occurred sooner than expected, the buyer realized the upside. The economics of the buyer's rechased account could not be calculated until the account actually collected. The later the
account collected, the greater the discount (whether expressed as a straight discount reflected
in the purchase price or as the seller's obligation to pay a rate of return from a retained
interest in the sold accounts). If an account was collected sooner than expected, the discount
would be less. The discount, however, was not fixed at the outset of the sale based upon
anticipated collections. Therefore, recourse was not to warrant that the account would collect
when expected, but simply to insure that whatever the collections were the buyer would
receive an agreed-upon return, with the surplus going to the seller. See Union Sec., Inc. v.
Merchants' Trust & Say. Co., 185 N.E. 150 (Ind. 1933); cases cited supra note 17; see also In
re Carolina Uti!. Supply Co., 118 B.R. 412, 416 (Bankr. D.S.C. I 990)(holding sale of accounts
deemed a loan where purchaser received a stipulated return of two percent above prime on
funds advanced until accounts collected). In the seminal article on the sale of divisible interests
and bankruptcy, Schwarcz refers to this type of recourse as "adjustable recourse" because
the recourse adjusts retroactively to the actual collection rate to reflect the time value of
money. Schwarcz, supra note 7, at 158. It is not fixed at the time of purchase and tied to the
payment terms of the underlying asset.
Finally, the fact that a seller has an obligation to repurchase accounts under circumstances
unrelated to the account debtor's failure to perform suggested that recourse, and thus the
economics of the buyer's bargain, was unrelated to the collectibility of the asset sold. Major's
Furniture Mart, 602 F.2d at 541; Blackford v. Commercial Credit Corp., 263 F.2d 97, \05-06
(5th Cir. 1959).
39. See A.B. Lewis Co. v. National Inv. Corp., 421 S.W.2d 723 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
40. 116 N.E. 143 (Ill. 1917)
41. Id. at 149.
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course against the seller were tied directly to the collectibility of the underlying asset. The seller's recourse exposure was not that of a borrower,
but that of a seller who, by accepting recourse, agrees to a "plain contract
of bargain and sale, with a warranty of soundness of the property. "42
Recourse to a seller who warrants performance of the asset it sells (i.e.,
collectibility) should not turn a sale into a loan. Under the case law, however, an absolute promise by the seller to repay the purchase price, with
an agreed upon rate of return unrelated to the payment terms of the
underlying asset, clearly risks turning a sale into a loan. In recognizing this
principle, it is important to understand that the difference between recourse for collectibility and economic recourse is not the difference between a buyer accepting significant financial risk and one who accepts
none. In fact, in some situations, the economic bargain between a true
buyer of a financial asset who has recourse for collectibility and a lender
with economic recourse can be roughly equal. 43 On the one hand, a true
buyer, unlike a lender, cannot adjust its return after the purchase to ensure
a market return at all times. 44 A buyer, however, would enjoy the upside
in value if, for instance, the asset was collected earlier than the parties
expected. And so long as the buyer has recourse for collectibility, it could
protect itself against the underlying obligor's default.
The real difference between recourse for collectibility and economic
recourse is what each says about the type of transaction the parties intended. Recourse for collectibility merely improves the quality of the asset
transferred. The purchaser with recourse cannot do better economically
than the purchaser without recourse if the asset performs in accordance
with its terms. The economic terms of the transaction are defined by the
cash flows of the asset itself and collectibility recourse is defined solely by
the failure of the asset to perform. On the other hand, economic recourse
in some fashion guarantees the return to the purchaser without regard to
the economic characteristics of the transferred asset. In the truest sense of
the word, the transferred asset serves merely as collateral, as its own financial characteristics do not serve to define the economic terms of the
transaction. Transfers with economic recourse look and smell like loans,
and because enforcing important state law policies-like prohibiting
usury-turned on determining the appropriate characterization of trans42. Nichols v. Fearson, 32 U.S. 103, III (1833) (finding that the sale ofa note at discount
with recourse to the indorser was a sale not a loan).
43. See irifra text accompanying notes 81-86.
44. See, e.g., Major's Furniture Mart, Inc. v. Castle Credit Corp., 602 F.2d 538, 546 (3d
Cir. 1979) (interpreting sale agreement to allow retroactive changes in the discount for prior
purchases to track movements in the prime rate). Although a fixed rate lender may not be
able to adjust its return after its loan is made, it still may be able to protect itself against
market value erosion in ways that a buyer cannot. See irifra note 85.
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actions, courts historically have had little hesitation recharacterizing such
transfers as loans. 45
45. Economic recourse does not mean that the buyer's return on the asset sold has to
equal what the seller's return would have been absent the sale. Obviously, a buyer who buys
receivables at a discount would earn an overall rate of return on the receivables greater than
that which would have been earned by the seller had no sale occurred. The buyer's return
would be a function of the purchase price discount and the subsequent cash flows generated
by the receivables. Even if the buyer has recourse to the seller, so long as recourse was limited
to collectibility, it would not alter the return the buyer would otherwise earn if the receivables
were to collect in accordance with their terms. This type of recourse should not turn the sale
into a loan.
Economic recourse also does not mean that the buyer and the seller could not agree to
an arrangement, such as an interest rate swap, structured to pay the buyer a floating rate
return from a fixed rate investment or vice-versa. For instance, if the buyer of a pool of fixed
rate receivables thinks interest rates will rise, it may wish to structure the purchase so that it
earns a floating rate of interest instead of a fixed rate. One way to do this would be to
purchase a swap from a third party and thus trade a fixed rate for a floating rate. This thirdparty arrangement, of course, should have no effect on the true sale nature ofthe underlying
transaction.
Similarly, the buyer could also purchase a swap from the seller. Superficially this might
look like economic recourse because the seller would be liable for a rate of return that differs
from the return implied from the terms of the receivables sold. It should not, however,
constitute economic recourse if the swap, in substance, is a separate buy/sell transaction in
which the seller of the receivable is compensated at a market rate for providing the swap. It
should also make little difference whether the seller satisfies its obligations under the swap
directly from its own pocket or, instead, out of any interest it otherwise might have retained
in the receivables sold.
Finally, consider a different scenario-one in which the buyer and seller agree to make
payments to each other not as a result of interest rate changes (as in the case of the swap)
but instead as a result of differences in the timing of collections on sold receivables from that
which was anticipated at the time of sale. A more expansive theory of true sale than that set
forth in this Article would permit the buyer and seller to make these kinds of payments to
each other so long as the payments were from the cash flows generated from the sale ofthe
receivables or the proceeds of collection.
For instance, under this expansive theory, if a pool of receivables performs more slowly
than anticipated, the seller may make compensating payments to the purchaser so long as
the payments are from the proceeds received by the seller from the purchaser in payment of
the purchase price. In parallel fashion, if the pool of transferred receivables pays more quickly
than anticipated, the purchaser may make compensating payments to the seller from collections received by the purchaser on account of the transferred receivables. In either situation,
the parties are merely reallocating cash flows of a particular transaction to acljust for differences between what had been anticipated by the parties and what had actually occurred. On
the other hand, if the seller makes payments in excess of the purchase price, or the purchaser
makes payments in excess of collections (or payments received on account of collections), the
adjustments go beyond merely allocating cash flows. Instead, they suggest a level of recourse
that goes beyond that which would be appropriate in a true sale.
Admittedly, one could argue that this expansive theory of true sale is ahead of where the
case law generally is today. A number of the authors, however, believe that it would be
appropriate and logical for any practical theory of true sale to allow the parties to a sale of
a financial asset to allocate cash flows between themselves to reflect the economics that had
been mutually anticipated at the time of sale. Securitization now involves the elaborate reconfiguration of cash flows to accommodate the economic needs of sellers and investors. See
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Admittedly, not all of the recharacterization cases involving recourse
can be catalogued into recourse for collectibility (sale) and economic recourse (loan).46 This distinction between recourse for collectibility and economic recourse, however, holds true for a significant number of recharacterization cases, and continues to appear in case law today.47
For instance, in Goldstein v. Madison National Bank,48 the debtor could not
pay $201,000 it owed to Madison National Bank. The debtor, however,
did have an asset-an approximately $1 million receivable owed by one
of its customers. The bank and the debtor entered into an agreement
under which the debtor "absolutely assigned" (i.e., sold) $200,000 of the
receivable to the bank. Once the assignment had been agreed to, the bank
stopped accruing interest on the debt, and the parties treated the debt as
extinguished by the transfer.
The customer paid the receivable. Within one week of this payment,
but more than ninety days after the original assignment of the receivable,
the debtor filed for bankruptcy. The district court affirmed the bankruptcy
court, ruling that the payment was not preferential because the assignment
constituted an absolute assignment and not a secured transaction. 49
It is noteworthy that the court was not troubled that only part of the
receivable-the right to the first $200,000 of collections of a $1 million
JASON H. P. KRAVITI', THE SECURITIZATION OF FINANCIAL ASSETS (1996). The Financial
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) has recognized the necessity for creating a theory of
transfers that accommodates the reality of the market place by adopting a new standard to
apply to securitization, the "financial components approach," applicable to fiscal years beginning after December 31, 1996. See FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS No. 125, ACCOUNTING FOR TRANSFERS
AND SERVICING OF FINANCIAL ASSETS AND EXTINGUISHMENTS OF LIABILITIES ~ 107 (June
1996). This approach allows for the reconfiguration of cash flows without disqualifying a
transfer from being derecognized by the transferor. Rather, the transferor and the transferee
merely recognize the financial components that each now controls after giving effect to the
reconfiguration. Id.
46. According to some cases, recourse, even if just for collectibility, suggests a loan. In
other cases, a sale with full economic recourse was nonetheless treated as a sale. Compare West
Pico Furniture Co. v. Pacific Furniture Loans, 2 Cal. 3d 594, 604-06 (1970) (holding assignment of conditional sales contract with recourse was a loan, not a sale because "at all times
the risk of nonpayment" was borne by the assignor) with Hatoff v. Lemons & Assocs., Inc.
(In re Lemons & Assocs., Inc.), 67 B.R. 198,201 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1986) (holding assignment
of mortgage notes treated as a sale notwithstanding court's acknowledgement that purchasers
were "guaranteed [aJ rate of interest ... regardless of the terms, maturity date or performance history of their particular note").
47. This distinction even appears in most "risk of loss" cases. See il!fra text accompanying
note 65. In emphasizing this distinction, the authors do not mean to suggest that the presence
of any amount of economic recourse should automatically turn a sale into a loan. A number
of the authors believe that if economic recourse exists in a particular sale transaction, but is
not material or is qualified in a material fashion, and if there are other indicia of sale, then
the transaction should qualifY as a sale.
48. 89 B.R. 274 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1988).
49. Id. at 277.
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receivable-had been sold. Instead, as part of its analysis, it referred to
the case of Lyon v. Ty- Wood Corp. ,50 in which the same question was at issue:
whether the right to receive the first $25,000 of a $30,000 receivable was
an absolute assignment or a secured transaction. 51
The Lyon court also found the transaction to be an absolute assignment
(i.e., a sale).52 The sale of part of a receivable necessarily raises questions
concerning recourse. So long as the buyer receives the right to the first
dollars paid with respect to the receivable, the seller retains, as a practical
matter, some of the risk concerning the value of the receivables. In Goldstein,
the court specifically recognized and reaffirmed the holding of Major's Furniture Mart: the presence of recourse in a sale transaction will not, without
more, automatically convert a sale into a secured loan transaction. 53 Moreover, the recourse in Goldstein was purely for collectibility, and not for economic recourse. The bank stopped accruing interest upon the sale, the
account did not bear interest, and the seller did not warrant any particular
rate of return.
Similarly, the Supreme Court's recent decision in Nebraska Department if
Revenue v. Loewenstein54 also supports the concept of true sale with recourse
for collectibility. Loewenstein concerned federal debt securities purchased for
cash by certain mutual funds under repurchase agreements which later
obligated the funds to resell the securities to the original owner. Upon
resale, the funds received an amount equal to the price paid by them for
the securities "plus interest at an agreed-upon rate that bears no relation
to the yield on the underlying securities."55 The issue was whether the
interest paid to the funds was interest on federal government obligations,
and thus not subject to state income tax, or interest on loans. 56
The funds argued that the transaction was a true purchase and sale,
and the interest paid should be treated as interest from the securities purchased by the funds. Although the Court specifically declined to address
whether the securities were actually purchased by the funds,57 it gave several reasons for treating the interest paid to the seller as interest on loans.
First, the interest paid to the buyer bore no relation to the interest paid or
accrued in the underlying security. Second, upon the seller's default, the
50. 239 A.2d 819 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1968).
51. Id. at 821.
52. Id. at 822.
53. Both Goldstein and Lyon involved transactions in which the receivable was sold in
exchange for canceling an antecedent debt. Assignments of a single receivable in satisfaction
of an antecedent debt are expressly excluded from Article 9 by U.C.C. § 9-104(fj (1995).
Nonetheless, in determining whether a transaction is a true sale or a secured transaction,
there should be no meaningful distinction drawn between a transfer for antecedent debt and
a transfer for new value.
54. 115 S. Ct. 557 (1994).
55. !d. at 559.
56. Id. at 561.
57. Id. at 564.
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buyer's interest in proceeds would be limited to a return of its investment
plus its predetermined yield. Third, the seller bore the risk and received
the upside benefit of change in the market value of the underlying asset.
Fourth, the seller could "substitute" equivalent securities for the ones initially purchased by the buyer. 58
The Court's reasoning is directly in line with the theory of this Article
as to the distinction between recourse for collectibility and economic recourse. A sale of a financial asset with recourse for collectibility only, and
not economic recourse, would bear none of the above characteristics; a
sale with economic recourse would often bear them all. In a typical case
of receivables sold with recourse for collectibility59 (i) the buyer's return is
tied directly to the payment terms of the underlying asset; (ii) upon liquidation, the buyer's interest in proceeds is not limited to this investment
plus a predetermined rate of return that is unrelated to the underlying
asset; (iii) only the buyer's interest, not the seller's, is affected by post purchase changes in the asset's market value; and (iv) normally, the seller
would not have a right to substitute the asset purchased with a new asset.50

Recourse and "Risk of Loss" Cases
Several recent cases hold, mistakenly in the authors' view, that a sale
does not occur unless the buyer assumes the "risk of loss" associated with
the asset. Even though in most of these cases recharacterization was appropriate because the "buyer" had economic recourse, the rationale of
these cases, if correct, would preclude true sale treatment for any transfer
sold with recourse for collectibility.
In re Executive Growth Investments, Inc.,51 is typical of these kinds of cases.
The dispute involved an assignment of a fractional interest in a secured
promissory note. The note was payable to the debtor, Executive Growth
Investments (EGl), and EGI had assigned its interest in the note with
58. Id.
59. See i1!fra text accompanying notes 77-81.
60. The Supreme Court in Loewenstein noted that the seller was liable for any deficiency
upon foreclosure. Loewenstein, 115 S. Ct. at 562. A seller who accepts recourse for collectibility
may also be so liable. The securities in Loewenstein, however, were risk-free federal securities.
Thus, any loss that the funds might suffer upon foreclosure would be a loss in market value
due to interest rate changes, not a loss due to a default under the securities themselves.
Recourse in Loewenstein, therefore, was economic recourse, not recourse for collectibility.
61. Rechnitzer v. Boyd (In re Executive Growth Invs., Inc.), 40 B.R. 417 (Bankr. C.D. Cal.
1984); see also In re Lendvest Mortgage, Inc., 119 B.R. 199 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1990); Ryan v.
Zinker (In re Sprint Mortgage Brokers Corp.), 164 B.R. 224 (Bankr. E.D.NY 1994); European
Am. Bank v. Sackman Mortgage Corp. (In re Sackman Mortgage Corp.), 158 B.R. 926 (Bankr.
S.D.NY 1993); In re Coronet Capital Co., 142 B.R. 78 (Bankr. S.D.NY 1992); Ables v.
Major Funding Corp. (In re Major Funding Corp.), 82 B.R. 443 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1987);
Castle Rock Indus. Bank v. S.O.A.W Enter., Inc. (In re S.O.A.W. Enter., Inc.), 32 B.R. 279
(Bankr. WD. Tex. 1983).
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recourse to various investors, including a Mrs. Feldman who held an 8.2%
interest in the note. EGI kept possession of the note.
After EGI filed bankruptcy, the maker paid the note. The Chapter 7
trustee argued that the assignment was a loan, not a sale, and that because
Mrs. Feldman failed to perfect her interest in the note under state law, her
claim to her share of the proceeds of the note was voidable.
In order to decide the issue, the court had to decide the parties' intentions. 62 According to the court, this meant looking "past the expressed
intention of the parties ... [to] some purer intention behind the form. "63
Although the court began its analysis with the HC.C., it noted the absence
of "any express guidance from the HC.C. "64 and formulated its own test.
The court asked the question: "[W]ho bears the risk of loss in the event
of non-payment?"65 The court continued:
Applying that analysis to the A & W note, I can reframe the question
in this way: absent bankruptcy, as between the transferor EGI and
the transferee Mrs. Feldman, who would have borne the loss if the
note had gone unpaid? And on this issue, I think the record is beyond
dispute. The agreement specifically provides that the transfer is "with
recourse." I take that to mean that if the note had proven uncollectible, then the transferee Mrs. Feldman would have recourse against
the transferor EGl. By express agreement then, EGI bore the risk of
loss. On the analysis set forth above, I find that EGI made something
less than an absolute transfer. I thus conclude that Mrs. Feldman can
have at best no more than a security interest. 66
Although there may have been other reasons to call the sale a 10an,67
the court relied on a risk of loss analysis to get to this answer. This was
62. Executive Growth Inv., 40 B.R. at 422. UC.C. Article 9, and its rules of perfection, apply
"to any transaction (regardless of its form) which is intended to create a security interest."
UC.C. § 9-102 (1995).
63. Executive Growth Inv., 40 B.R. at 422.
64. Id.
65. !d.
66. !d. The court's conclusion was dicta. Under California law, which applied to the
transaction, a sale of personal property not accompanied by delivery to and possession by
the buyer is "conclusively presumed fraudulent and void as against the transferor's creditors."
CAL. CIV. CODE § 3440 (1970 & West Supp. 1996). Therefore, as the Executive Growth Investments court recognized, Mrs. Feldman's interest in the note was voidable under the "strongarm" provisions of II US.C. § 544(a) (1994), irrespective of whether the transfer was a sale.
Executive Growth Inv., 40 B.R. at 420.
67. The court specifically noted, for example, that Mrs. Feldman bargained for a 12%
annual return and a return of principal at the end of one year. Id. at 422. Although the terms
of the note in which Mrs. Feldman claimed an interest were not detailed in the opinion, it
seems that the return to Mrs. Feldman may have had nothing to do with the terms of the
note and was thus a form of economic recourse. Economic recourse also existed in most
other "risk ofloss" cases. See Ryan v. Zinker (In re Sprint Mortgage Brokers Corp.), 164 B.R.
224 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y 1994); European Am. Bank v. Sackman Mortgage Corp. (In re Sackman
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wrong. Prior case law has recognized that one could have a true sale with
recourse for collectibility.68 Moreover, the u.e.e., the starting point in the
court's analysis, makes it clear that "there may be a true sale of accounts
or chattel paper ... although recourse exists. "69
Finally, consider the result had EGI not assigned undivided interests in
the note to several investors with recourse, but simply assigned all of its
interest with recourse to one investor. The transfer of a negotiable instrument (a check, a note, or a draft) in the ordinary course of commerce is
customarily accomplished by indorsement and delivery.70 As a general
rule, when a seller indorses a negotiable instrument over to a buyer, it does
so with full recourse. 71 The nature of recourse that arises upon indorsement is similar to the liability of a guarantor and to that of one who sells

Mortgage Corp.), 158 B.R. 926 (Bankr. S.D.N.V 1993); Ables v. Major Funding Corp. (In re
Major Funding Corp.), 82 B.R. 433 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1987); Castle Rock Indus. Bank v.
S.O.A.W Enter., Inc. (In re S.O.A.w, Enter., Inc.), 32 B.R. 279 (Bankr. w,n. Tex. 1983). In
each of the foregoing cases, the buyer's return was unrelated to the payment terms of the
asset sold. See supra note 38. In Lendvest, the debtor was obligated to repurchase a note assigned
with recourse apparently at any time regardless of whether the note was in default. In re
Lendvest Mortgage, Inc., 119 B.R. 199, 20 I (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1990). This indicated economic
recourse because recourse to the seller was not limited to collectibility. The facts in Coronet
Capital suggest the presence of economic recourse, but they are too unclear to say for certain.
The court noted that the participant "was to receive payments of three and one-halfpercent
above the prime rate of interest with a minimum rate of 15% per year," but did not disclose
the yield on the underlying loan and whether it differed from the return promised to the
participant. See In re Coronet Capital Co., 142 B.R. 78, 80 (Bankr. S.D.NY 1992). According
to the seller's offer to sell a participation in the underlying mortgage loan, however, the
mortgage loan bore interest at the rate of prime plus five percent with no minimum; accordingly, it was possible, and indeed likely, that if the prime rate decreased to nine and one-half
percent or below, the mortgage loan would not generate enough interest to meet the 15%
minimum that had been promised to the participant. The court in Woodl'on relied heavily on
the fact that interest spread between the underlying mortgage and the yield guaranteed to
each new participant seemed to change. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Grover (In re Woodson
Co.), 813 E2d 266, 272 (9th Cir. 1987). Although to the court this may have suggested
something akin to economic recourse and thus a loan, the yield demanded by each new
participant (and hence the spread) in a true sale should in reality have changed over time as
interest rates changed.
68. See Major's Furniture Mart, Inc. v. Castle Credit Corp., 602 E2d 538 (3d Cir. 1979).
69. U.C.C. § 9-502 cmt. 4 (1995) ("The last sentence of subsection (2) therefore preserves
freedom of contract, and the subsection recognizes that there may be a true sale of accounts,
or chattel paper, or contract rights although recourse exists."). The fact that the Executive
Growth Investments court was dealing with a negotiable instrument instead of an account or
chattel paper is irrelevant. The transfer of negotiable instruments under the U.C.C. is routinely done with recourse.
70. "Unless otherwise agreed, if an instrument is transferred for value ... the transferee
has a specifically enforceable right to the unqualified indorsement of the transferor.... "
U.C.C. § 3-203(c) (1995).
71. Lake Hiwassee Dev. Co. v. Pioneer Bank, 535 S.w'2d 323, 326 (Tenn. 1976) (noting
that when chattel paper or other negotiable instruments are sold, "endorsement with recourse
is standard procedure in ... state[s] ... that have adopted the [V.C.C.]").
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any type of receivable with recourse. 72 The liability is contingent and secondary: "The term 'with recourse' ... implies the ... result-that the
drawer, or indorser, or transferor of the document will be liable if the
document is not honored by the primary obligor."73
Starting over 160 years ago with the Supreme Court, courts have made
it clear that having recourse against an indorser does not mean that a sale
is a loan. This is so even though a seller's indorsement "may well be
regarded in the light of a guarantee against the insolvency of the promissor."74
Given that millions of dollars of negotiable instruments are indorsed
and sold every day with recourse, it is hard to see the wisdom (not to
mention the consequences) of a per se rule of law that would treat all of
these sales as loans. Sales of negotiable instruments with recourse is how
many operate day to day. It would be a shock to all who regularly indorse
checks if their unrestricted indorsement were to produce a "loan" from
72. See Mercantile Bank v. Farmers & Merchants State Bank, 920 F.2d 1539, 1544 (10th
Cir. I 990),judgment vacated and appeal dismissed, No. 89-3047, 89-3063, 1991 WL 96039 (lOth
Cir. Mar. 4,1991).
73. Sticka v. Bestline, Inc. (In re Attaway, Inc.), 180 B.R. 274,278 (Bankr. D. Or. 1995).
The liability of an indorser ofa negotiable instrument is explained in § 3-415(a) of the UC.C.:
Subject to subsections (b), (c), (d), and (e) and to § 3-419(d), if an instrument is dishonored, an indorser is obliged to pay the amount due on the instrument (i) according to
the terms of the instrument at the time it was indorsed, or (ii) if the indorser indorsed
an incomplete instrument, according to its terms when completed, to the extent stated
in Sections 3-115 and 3-407. The obligation of the indorser is owed to a person entitled
to enforce the instrument or to a subsequent indorser who paid the instrument under
this section.
UC.C. § 3-4 I 5 (a) (1995).
74. Nichols v. Fearson, 32 US. 103, 110 (1833); see Lake Hiwassee Dev. Co. v. Pioneer
Bank, 535 S.W2d 323 (Tenn. 1976); Val Zimmermann Corp. v. Leffingwell, 318 N.W2d
781 (Wis. 1982). Moreover, even "[t]he presence of a reserve fund is not determinative of
the question of whether the transaction constituted a loan or sale." Lake Hiwassee, 535 S.W.2d
at 326. "The establishment of a reserve fund was a valid method whereby the bank insured
that it would receive payment on the notes endorsed by Lake Hiwassee, and is not sufficient
to convert an otherwise valid sale into a loan." /d. at 326-27. Some states have enacted laws
which deem recourse transfers of instruments to be loans for usury purposes. Baxter v. Stevens, 773 P.2d 890 (Wash. 1989). Even in those states, however, business-related transfers are
generally exempt, and such statutes are recognized as contrary to common law. Cases from
North Carolina apply usury laws to sales of instruments with recourse, but recognize that
this position is contrary to usury decisions in other states. See Western Auto Supply Co. v.
Vick, 277 S.E.2d 360 (N.C.), reh'g granted, 283 S.E.2d 101 (N.C. 1981); see also 6 SAMUEL
WILUSTON & GEORGE]' THOMPSON, A TREATISE ON THE LAw OF CONTRACTS § 1689,
at 4782 (1938) (stating the general rule that "a sale ... though accompanied with a guaranty
of the value of the article sold ... should not be regarded as within the purview of statutes
against usury, unless the parties are in fact intending a loan rather than a sale"). Moreover,
these cases recharacterize sales of negotiable instruments with recourse as loans in order to
vindicate a policy against usury. They do not stand for the proposition that the sale of every
note with recourse per se constitutes a loan.
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the transferee. Yet, holding, as the Executive Growth Investments and other
courts recently have held, that one cannot have a sale with recourse because risk of loss remains with the seller would do just that. 75

RECHARACTERIZATION IS APPROPRIATE ONLY IF THERE
IS ECONOMIC RECOURSE
Recourse per se cannot be the controlling issue in determining true sale;
indeed, many courts have found true sales to exist despite the presence of
recourse. Rather, as the court in Major's Furniture Mart framed it: "The
question is ... whether the nature of the recourse, and the true nature ...
of the transaction, are such that the legal rights and economic consequences of the agreement bear a greater similarity to a financing transaction or to a sale. "76
The court's emphasis on the "nature" of the recourse and its statement
that "[g]uaranties of ... collectibility alone, might be consistent with true
sale" place the proper focus on the question of recourse and true sale. 77
So, too, does the emphasis on "the nature of the transaction" and whether
the buyer's rights and interests bear "a greater similarity" to a loan than
a sale.
A sale with recourse for collectibility is consistent with the concept of
sale and certainly does not bear a greater similarity to a loan than a sale.
Sellers of many different types of assets, financial and otherwise, routinely
75. The law has an interest in encouraging the free transferability of negotiable instruments, and the presumption that an indorser warrants the terms of a negotiable instrument
serves that purpose. The law, however, also favors the free transferability of accounts. See
UC.C. § 9-318(4) (1995). While at some level there may be a difference between a negotiable
instrument and an account, a rule of law that would promote sales of negotiable instruments
with recourse but effectively prohibit such sales of other assets by applying a "risk of loss"
standard would make little sense. The funding efficiencies achieved in today's multi-billion
dollar securitization market suggest that the law should have a compelling interest in encouraging the free transferability of all kinds of financial assets.
76. Major's Furniture Mart, Inc. v. Castle Credit Corp., 602 F.2d 538,544 (3d Cir. 1979)
(footnote omitted). In a footnote, the court noted that Gilmore "would place almost controlling significance on the one factor of recourse." !d. at 545 n.12. The court's statement
was based upon the following Gilmore quote:
If there is no right of charge-back or recourse with respect to uncollectible accounts and
no right to claim for a deficiency, then the transaction should be held to be a sale,
entirely outside the scope of Part 5. If there is a right to charge back uncollectible
accounts (a right, as § 9-502 puts it, of "full or limited recourse") or a right to claim a
deficiency, then the transaction should be held to be for security and thus subject to
Part 5 as well as the other Parts of the Article.
2 GIlMORE, supra note II, § 44.4, at 1230. For a good discussion of the Gilmore quote and
why it does not mean what it seems to say, see Plank, supra note 5, at 320-22.
77. Major's Furniture Mart, 602 F.2d at 545 (quoting Major's Furniture Mart, Inc. v. Castle
Credit Corp., 449 F. Supp. 538, 543 (E.D. Pa. 1978)).
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warrant the future performance of the asset sold. 78 Moreover, in some
situations, a buyer with recourse for collectibility only and not economic
recourse assumes risks that a lender would not.
Take the simple case of a buyer of a pool of noninterest bearing trade
receivables. Assume the buyer purchases the pool at a discount which
contemplates an average collection rate of thirty-five days. If, on average,
the receivables actually collect in full in forty days, the buyer's yield would
be less than expected, although the assets would have performed as promised (i.e., the receivables collected ultimately in full). A buyer with recourse
for collectibility would have no claim against the seller. A buyer with economic recourse, however, would. In that situation, even though the obligor
paid in full, the buyer would have the right to recover without limit the
rest of its expected yield from the seller and the transaction would be
economically indistinguishable from a loan. Economic recourse not only
protects the buyer's interest in the asset (which would be consistent with a
sale) but also the buyer's interest in receiving a predetermined rate of
return which bears no direct relationship to the asset itself. 79 The buyer's
risk in the transaction is reduced to that of a lender.8o
78. For a discussion of the role of recourse in the sale of other property, see Plank, supra
note 5, at 339-43; see also U.C.C. § 3-414 (1995) (stating indorser's liability upon sale of a
negotiable instrument). The fact that recourse for collectibility may be consistent with both
the concept of loan and sale does not mean that its presence mandates the treatment of a
transaction as a loan. See A.B. Lewis Co. v. National Invs. Corp. of Houston, 421 S.W2d.
723,728 (Tex. Ct. App. 1967); if. Cohen v. Army Moral Support Fund (In re Bevill), 67 B.R.
557 (Bankr. D.NJ. 1986). The court noted:
The mere presence of secured loan characteristics in repo and reverse repo agreements
is not enough to negate the parties' voluntary decision to structure the transaction as
purchases and sales. There is nothing in Article 2 of the U.C.C. governing sales which
would preclude parties from incorporating terms which are common features of collateralized loans into agreements which otherwise have legitimate attributes of a purchase
and sale.

!d. at 598.
79. Interest in a situation like the one described above would be set at a rate that reflects
two things: the risk that the asset would not perform as promised (default risk) and risk of
loss associated with the time value of money (arising as a result of lost opportunity and
inflation). See Peter V. Pantaleo & Barry W Ridings, Reorganization Value, 51 Bus. LAw. 419,
430 n.4l (1996). Default risk is directly related to the quality of the asset sold because it can
be eliminated if the asset collects in full. The risk ofloss for the time value of money, however,
is not necessarily eliminated if the asset collects in full and thus is a risk that reflects a potential
loss that is unrelated to the quality of the asset sold. A buyer of non interest-bearing receivables
with recourse for collectibility tries to eliminate default risk by assuring itself of the quality
of the asset it buys. A buyer with economic recourse goes beyond this by trying to eliminate
risk not associated with the asset but with the time value of money-an investment risk real
buyers often assume and lenders never do.
80. As discussed above, often courts recharacterize sales as loans if, in addition to recourse
that eliminates all risk to the buyer (including economic risk), the seller also retains the right
to any surplus collections, a right also typically associated with a loan and not a true sale. See
Major's Furniture Mart, Inc. v. Castle Credit Corp., 602 F.2d 538 (3d Cir. 1979); In re Grand
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If the terms of the receivables were such that the obligors were contractually bound to pay, on average, within thirty-five days, a buyer might
attempt to lock in its return because, in that instance, a warranty of collectibility arguably would mean collectibility in full and on a timely basis.
In such a case, the discount applied to the purchase can be calculated to
assure a return based upon collections within thirty-five days, or payment
in lieu of such collections by the seller. Of course, in many situations involving trade receivables, a warranty like this could not be given because
there is often no fixed payment date for a trade receivable. 8l Instead,
payment within a broader time period may be all that is required, based
upon the course of dealing between the parties or the custom in the industry.82 If the account party was clearly obligated to pay by a certain date,
however, or if finance charges accrued on the account, a warranty of collectibility would insure payment of principal on a timely basis and thus a
rate of return to the buyer.
This scenario obviously presents a more difficult question of true sale
than the earlier illustration involving the pool of receivables that collect
five days late. In the earlier illustration, the buyer suffers real economic
loss, even with recourse, that a lender never does, and so a true sale determination clearly seems appropriate. In this scenario, the buyer might
suffer no loss,83 yet the transfer would be a true sale because (i) recourse
for the buyer's return is contingent upon, and not independent of, the
collectibility of the asset purchased;84 (ii) there is still a potential for loss in
Union Co. 219 F. 353 (2d Cir. 1914). In nearly all of those cases, however, economic recourse
was an element of the transaction. Surplus is effectively defined as whatever is collected by
the buyer above a predetermined rate of return unrelated to the payment characteristics of
the asset sold. Transactions in which the buyer did not have economic recourse have been
treated as sales despite the fact that the seller was entitled to collections after a specified
amount was received by the buyer. See generally Goldstein v. Madison Nat'l Bank, 89 B.R.
274 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1988); Coast Fin. Corp. v. Ira F. Powers Furniture Co., 209 P. 614 (Or.
1922); see also Steven Schwarcz, A New Theory qf Recourse, ASSET SALE REP., Feb. 14, 1994,
at 8.
81. See Milana v. Credit Discount Co., 163 P.2d 869 (1945) (finding no sale when, among
other things, seller of accounts guaranteed payments within specified periods not corresponding to the maturity dates of the accounts).
82. See Frank Novak & Sons, Inc. v. Sommer & MACA Indus., 538 N.E.2d 700 (Ill. 1989)
(time of payment for goods delivered may be determined by parties' agreement as reflected
in "course of dealing or usage of trade or course of performance"); if. Brownie's Army &
Navy Store, Inc. v. EJ. Burke,Jr., Inc., 424 N.YS.2d 800, 803, 28 HC.C. Rep. Servo (Callaghan) 90, 93 (Sup. Ct. 1980) ("The custom and practice of the parties can affect the
imposition of interest. The evidence here is that plaintiff never expected his customer to pay
interest unless the account was very 'late.' ").
83. This assumes, of course, that the market value of the obligation purchased did not
deteriorate as a result of a change in interest rates or the credit-worthiness of the seller or
the underlying obligor.
84. In Major's Furniture Mart, for example, the Third Circuit stressed that the buyer had
recourse to compel the seller to repurchase accounts under certain circumstances regardless
of whether the obligor defaulted. Major's Furniture Mart, 602 F.2d at 545.
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market value to the buyer if interest rates rise after the purchase or if the
credit-worthiness of the underlying obligor or the seller deteriorates;85 and
(iii) the buyer would still enjoy the upside of ownership were the account
to collect early. 86

A SALE THAT WOUW NOT BE RECHARACTERIZED
UNDER STATE LA W SHOUW BE ENFORCED UNDER
BANKRUPTCY LA W
Property Rights in Bankruptcy Are Governed By State Law
Two fundamental policies underlie bankruptcy law: equality of treatment for creditors and rehabilitation for the debtor. Whether a transfer of
assets is a true sale is often an issue in bankruptcy cases because the answer
can impact these policies. If a debtor's prepetition sale of property is a true
sale, then the property is no longer part of the debtor's estate in bankruptcy
and the buyer's rights in the property are not subject to the automatic stay.
As a result, the property cannot be used by the debtor either for reorganization or as a source of value for paying its creditors.
These bankruptcy policies often compel a court to examine issues of
true sale, and compel courts to do so independently of concerns about
usury, fraud, or other matters of state law (although a bankruptcy court
will be concerned about those issues as well). But while bankruptcy policies
lead bankruptcy courts to examine whether a sale is in fact a true sale,
bankruptcy courts must apply state law in order to come to the answer. Questions in
bankruptcy over ownership of property can only be answered by applying
state law, even if the answer yields an unfortunate result for a debtor and
its creditors. In Butner v. United States,87 a unanimous U.S. Supreme Court
adopted the view, already held by the Second, Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, and
85. In Major's Furniture Mart, the court interpreted the transaction to conclude that the
"buyer," Castle, was able to protect itself against "any conceivable loss" by unilaterally adjusting the interest rate payable by the seller in respect of purchased loans. Making this kind
of adjustment would help to assure a market return for the buyer. Major's Furniture Mart, 602
F.2d at 546. The court's interpretation, however, was wrong. The buyer did announce unilaterally that the discount rate for loans purchased after a certain date would float based on
the prime rate; the court's own review of a typical transaction reveals, however, that the
discount was applied only at the purchase of a loan; after the loan was purchased, there was
no floating or fluctuating interest charged with respect to that loan. [d. at 540-41. Moreover,
the seller acquiesced in the pricing change since it continued to sell loans to Castle. A more
significant indication of a secured loan transaction was the fact that Castle was also able to
force Major's Furniture Mart to repurchase accounts if Major's defaulted upon its agreement
with Castle or went out of business even if the accounts were not in default. Castle was
therefore able to protect the market value of its investment much like any lender who relies
on financial or otherwise covenant protection to compel immediate repayment if the borrower's condition or the collateral deteriorates.
86. See Chase & Baker Co. v. National Trust & Credit Co., 215 F. 633 (N.D. Ill. 1914).
87. 440 U.S. 48 (1979).
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Ninth Circuits, that property rights are determined by state law even in a
bankruptcy proceeding:
Property interests are created and defined by state law. Unless some
federal interest requires a different result, there is no reason why such
interests should be analyzed differently simply because an interested
party is involved in a bankruptcy proceeding.... The justifications
for application of state law are not limited to ownership interests; they
apply with equal force to security interests.... 88
In Butner, the Court reasoned that "[u]niform treatment of property
interests by both state and federal courts within a State serves to reduce
uncertainty, to discourage forum shopping, and to prevent a party from
receiving 'a windfall merely by reason of the happenstance of bankruptcy.' "89
According to Butner, state property rights can be overridden only by a
federal statute or interest. The Court, however, did not define what constitutes a federal interest that would allow a bankruptcy court to override
state law and to modify property rights. Courts, when using the federal
interest exception in Butner, often rely on the congressional goal of encouraging reorganizations in conjunction with a specific Bankruptcy Code
section which plainly demonstrates a federal interest that overrides state
law rights. 90 For instance, in In re Hudson Shipbuilders, Inc.,91 the bankruptcy
court determined that a specific Bankruptcy Code provision, section
506(b), manifested a sufficient federal interest to supersede state law rights
in connection with a mortgage provision. In that case, a junior secured
creditor sought to purchase the senior secured creditor's mortgage. A dispute arose over the amount of attorneys' fees the senior creditor would be
entitled to receive based upon the debtor's default. Although the note in
question provided for fifteen percent of the outstanding principal balance
as the amount of attorneys' fees, the court determined the amount of
attorneys' fees under section 506(b) and did not regard the fifteen percent
provision as determinative. 92 The court awarded $30,000 as reasonable
attorneys' fees rather than fifteen percent of the balance due on the note,
which would have been $190,000. 93 The Fifth Circuit held: "Congress has
clearly chosen to exercise its broad power to establish a uniform rule respecting the existence and extent of a right by enacting § 506(b). Accord88. Id. at 55 (citation omitted).
89. Id. (citing Lewis v. Manufacturers Nat'l Bank, 365 U.S. 603 (1961)).
90. See Olathe, Kansas v. KAR Dev. Assocs., L.P. (In re KAR Dev. Assocs., L.P.), 180 B.R.
629 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1995); In re Heron, Burchette, Ruckert & Rothwell, 148 B.R. 660 (Bankr.
D.D.C. 1992).
91. Blackburn-Bliss Trust v. Hudson Shipbuilders, Inc. (In re Hudson Shipbuilders, Inc.),
794 F.2d 1051 (5th Cir. 1986).
92. Id. at 1055.
93. /d. at 1058-59
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ingly, the holding in Butner is not applicable. Here, a paramount federal
interest dictates that federal law shall govern."94
Admittedly, notwithstanding illustrative cases like Hudson Shipbuilders,
there is no ready rule of law that enables one to determine whether, in a
given dispute in a bankruptcy proceeding, a "paramount federal interest"
is implicated such that federal law, and not state law, governs the parties'
rights. Nonetheless, it seems clear that if the "federal interest" exception
is not to swallow the rule, a bankruptcy court's perception of equity, standing alone, should not constitute an identifiable federal interest that would
override state law rights, even for the sake of promoting reorganization or
fostering equality among creditors. In Butner, for instance, the Court made
it clear that generalized notions of equity cannot replace state law rights:
The minority of courts which have rejected state law have not done
so because of any congressional command or because their approach
serves any identifiable federal interest. Rather, they have adopted a
uniform federal approach to the question of the mortgagee's interest
in rents and profits because of their perception of the demands of
equity. The equity powers of the bankruptcy court play an important
part in the administration of bankrupt estates in countless situations
in which the judge is required to deal with particular, individualized
problems. But undifined considerations if equity provide no basis for adoption
if a uniform .federal rule qjfOrding mortgagees an automatic interest in the rents
as soon as the mortgagor is declared bankrupt. 95
Indeed, prior to Butner, the Seventh Circuit, contrary to the overwhelming majority of circuits, had established a doctrine that allowed bankruptcy
courts to alter entitlements in order to achieve more equitable treatment
of creditors. 96 Butner, however, "expressly rejected [this] doctrine."97
94. !d. at 1058.
95. Butner v. United States, 440 US. 48, 55 (1978) (emphasis added); see BFP v. Resolution
Trust Corp., 511 US. 531 (1994); Amdura Nat'l Distrib. Co. v. Amdura Corp. (In re Amdura
Corp.), 75 F.3d 1447 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding state law determines property rights in bankruptcy); Dewhirst v. Citibank (Arizona) (In re Contractors Equip. Supply Co.), 861 F.2d 241
(9th Cir. 1988) (finding state law determines what constitutes property of the estate under II
US.C. § 541).
96. See Boston and Maine Corp. v. Chicago Pac. Corp., 785 F.2d 562, 566 (7th Cir. 1986).
97. Id. at 566; see also Union Pac. R.R. v. Moritz (In re Iowa R.R.), 840 F.2d 535, 536-37
(7th Cir. 1988) ("[P]roperty rights are defined in most cases by state law. When they are so
defined, the bankruptcy court must implement rather than alter them. "); In re Chicago,
Milwaukee, St. Paul and Pac. R.R., 791 F.2d 524, 532 (7th Cir. 1986) ("Bankruptcy law
provides a federal machinery for enforcing creditors' rights but the rights themselves are
created by state law."); Kham & Nate's Shoes No.2, Inc. v. First Bank, 908 F.2d 1351, 1361
(7th Cir. 1990) (" [B] ankruptcy judges no longer have equitable powers to modify contracts
to achieve 'fair' distributions. Bankruptcy judges enforce entitlement created under state
law."); accord Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 US. 197 (1988); Official Comm. of
Equity Sec. Holders v. Mabey, 832 F.2d 299 (4th Cir. 1987); see also In re Contractors Equip.
Supply Co., 861 F.2d 241, 244 (9th Cir. 1988) (stating in a dispute over whether the debtor
had an interest in the receivable, "whether a debtor-in-possession has an interest in property
is determined by state law").
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Applying state law principles (e.g., the right to purchase or sell an asset
with recourse for collectibility) to decide true sale issues in bankruptcy cases
makes sense. 98 As noted, equal treatment for creditors and debtor rehabilitation are the two major bankruptcy goals. Neither goal, however, is so
threatened by the concept of a true sale with recourse for collectibility as
to require courts to create federal common law and ignore state law rights.
For example, a sale of financial assets, with or without recourse for
collectibility, does not offend the policy of equitable distribution. There is
no preference issue in a sale of financial assets because no debtor-creditor
relationship exists. There is no debt and therefore no possibility of a preference. 99 Even if the sale were treated as a loan there would be no preference issue. The sale of financial assets is typically a contemporaneous
exchange in which the buyer buys the assets for cash. As a contemporaneous transaction, the transfer of financial assets would not be a preference, even if characterized as a loan, because there is no antecedent debt.
The payment on those assets also would not be preferential (assuming,
again, that the transferor took the required steps to perfect its interest in
the assets) because the buyer receives no more when the assets collect than
it would receive in a liquidation of the debtor, regardless of whether one
calls the transfer a sale or a secured loan. 100
Similarly, in an arm's-length transaction, a sale of financial assets, with
or without recourse, should not be a fraudulent conveyance. 101 There
rarely will be a basis for asserting actual fraud in a typical structured
finance transaction. If anything, the transaction is intended to benefit the
debtor and its creditors by enabling the debtor to liquidate assets in a
highly efficient manner. Also, there rarely will be a basis for asserting
constructive fraud because the buyer of financial assets normally will have
paid reasonably equivalent value for the assets. The mere conversion of
longer term assets into cash, at a reasonably equivalent value without any
indicia of fraud or wrongful dealing, is not a fraudulent transfer. Even if it
98. See Thomas E. Plank, The Constitutional Limits qf Bankruptcy, 63 TENN. L. REv. 487,
559-81 (1996) (noting that, although Congress's power under the Constitution to enact bankruptcy laws allows it to adjust the state law rights of insolvent debtors and their creditors, a
bankruptcy law may not constitutionally impair the state law rights of third parties, that is,
those who are neither insolvent debtors nor their creditors-including the property rights of
those who buy property from the insolvent debtor).
99. Generally speaking, a preference is a transfer to or for the benefit of a creditor made
by an insolvent debtor within 90 days prior to bankruptcy in reduction of an antecedent debt
that enables a creditor to receive more on its debt than it would have received in a Chapter
7 liquidation absent the transfer. II U.S.C. § 547(b) (1994).
100. Of course, if the sale is with recourse and, as a result, the seller has to pay the buyer
for a shortfall in collection, the payment might be preferential. Whether the payment is or
is not preferential does not turn on whether the sale is a true sale (with recourse) or a secured
loan (with recourse).
101. Generally speaking, a fraudulent conveyance is a transfer by an insolvent debtor for
less than reasonably equivalent value or by a debtor with the intent to hinder, delay, or
defraud its creditors. II U.S.C. § 548(a) (1994).
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were, the voidability of the transfer would not depend on its characterization as either a sale or a loan. 102
Finally, as a practical matter, recharacterizing a sale with recourse for
collectibility (or even economic recourse) as a loan will not result in any
significant increased distribution to unsecured creditors. In most cases, the
buyer would have filed UC.C. financing statements and would be entitled
to the cash flow from the asset ahead of unsecured creditors, to pay back
its investment plus interest. 103 In cases like Executive Growth Investments, in
which recharacterization turned a sale into an unsecured loan, recharacterization vindicated no independent bankruptcy policy. It simply reflected
the court's belief that Mrs. Feldman intended a loan and underscored the
significance of Mrs. Feldman's failure to protect herself by taking the necessary steps that state law, not bankruptcy law, required her to take in
order to perfect her interest in the note assigned to her. Had Mrs. Feldman
perfected her interest under state law, then, regardless of what the bankruptcy court thought of the parties' true intentions, the trustee probably
would have been required to pay Mrs. Feldman her share of the note
proceeds, just as if she had owned them outright.
Of course, in a reorganization case, the financial assets of a business are
often a prime source of collateral for debtor-in-possession financing. A
trustee or debtor in possession might wish to undo a structured finance
deal entered into prior to the commencement of the case in order to have
available those assets to secure debtor-in-possession financing. Recharacterization of a sale transaction as a loan may permit the debtor to use the
cash collections to assist in its reorganization if it gives adequate protection. l04 Furthermore, because the automatic stay applies to loan collateral
but not to sold assets, recharacterization would suspend enforcement rights
and might result in a negotiated compromise of the secured claim. 105
Therefore, in some cases, even if a trustee or debtor cannot entirely avoid
102. Admittedly, it is easier for a debtor to dissipate or divert cash than it is to dispose of
financial assets. One might argue that the conversion of financial assets into the more easily
disposable cash itself represents a fraudulent transfer if the debtor tries to defraud its creditors
by then hiding the cash. Such an approach, however, could as easily be applied to a broad
range of transactions, including tangible asset sales and secured financings. This would make
it virtually impossible for financially troubled debtors ever to obtain financing for continuing
operations. So long as a buyer or creditor pays fair value for the assets transferred, and there
is no clear separate indicia of fraud (or, to be precise, fraud of which the transferee is or
should be aware), the mere conversion of longer term financial assets into cash should not
be viewed as a basis for fraudulent transfer attack. Moreover, whether the transfer is a sale
or a loan is irrelevant to this issue.
103. Interest would include post-petition interest to the extent proceeds exceed the principal amount of the buyer's investment plus accrued interest or of the bankruptcy. 11 US.C.
§ 506(a) (1994). In most securitizations, proceeds would be expected to cover postpetition
interest in the event of recharacterization.
104. Cj II US.C. § 363 (1994).
105. Cj II US.C. § I I 29(a)(7), (b)(2)(A) (1994).
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an interest in an asset, the estate might benefit from simply recharacterizing that interest as a secured claim rather than an ownership interest.
Nonetheless, the fact that recharacterization may assist the debtor's rehabilitation does not mean that a bankruptcy court can reform a bona fide
state law sales contract, particularly in cases in which the proceeds of the
sale of financial assets may have provided liquidity to help a debtor stave
off an earlier bankruptcy filing (and where the impact of such reformation
may be to inhibit other companies from undertaking transactions that
could allow sufficient liquidity to avoid bankruptcy altogether). Courts historically have recharacterized transactions under state law that were structured as sales to evade laws or frustrate public policy. 106 In a Chapter 11
case, recharacterizing a sale as a loan may, to some degree, enhance a
debtor's prospects for rehabilitation. Indeed, this would be true regardless
of whether the buyer had recourse to the seller. The fact that it would be
better for a debtor to turn a sale into a loan, however, is not, by itself,
enough to override the state law rights of the buyer.
For instance, in In re CIS Corp.,107 a trustee in bankruptcy argued that a
bankruptcy court had the power to recharacterize a lease as a secured
financing under section 105 of the Bankruptcy Code. The district court
rejected the trustee's argument, specifically noting that a recharacterization case "generally involves application of principles of contract interpretation" that turn on state law causes of action. lOB According to the court,
section 105 of the Bankruptcy Code did not provide an independent basis
to recharacterize the lease. "That provision merely provides the court with
equitable powers to further the substantive provisions of the code, it does
not empower the court to create a cause of action otherwise unavailable
under the bankruptcy code."I09
106. See supra text accompanying notes 11-14. In some cases, the issue may be over who
gets to keep the surplus proceeds (i.e., the proceeds in excess of the transferee's investment
plus yield). Ordinarily, if the transfer were a sale, the transferee would keep them; if it were
a loan, the surplus proceeds would be paid to the transferor. HC.C. § 9-502(2); see supra text
accompanying note 15. Therefore, if the amount of surplus is significant, the outcome of a
recharacterization dispute could have real economic consequences to a transferor in bankruptcy. Even so, it still seems that the fundamental question of whether a transfer is a sale or
a loan should be governed by state law, especially where the point of the question is to decide
a state law entitlement to surplus.
107. Hasset v. Bancohio Nat'l Bank (In re CIS Corp.), 172 B.R. 748 (Bankr. S.D.N.V.
1994).
108. Id. at 756.
109. Id. at 757. In support of its holding, the court noted the following cases:

Southern Ry. Co. v. Johnson Bronze Co., 758 E2d 137, 141 (3d Cir. 1985) (holding that § 105
did not give bankruptcy court authority to create a lien to secure payment of environmental cleanup costs when the contract obligating the debtor to pay such costs did not
provide for such a lien); United States v. Sutton, 786 E2d 1305, 1308 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding
that bankruptcy court did not have power under § 105 to authorize monthly allowance
for support of debtor's spouse who did not have a matured claim for support when
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The Third Circuit reached a similar conclusion in In re Jason Realty, Ito
a case that determined whether an assignment of rents to a mortgagor
constituted an absolute assignment or a security interest. Citing Butner, the
Third Circuit viewed the issue as one solely of New Jersey state law, unaffected by the bankruptcy court's equitable powers. I I I Indeed, the court
so stated in recognition of the potentially harmful consequences to the
debtor under state law:
Although our decision here may create serious obstacles for debtors
whose sole income stream is rents, Butner mandates that we interpret
the assignment as New Jersey courts would construe it outside the
bankruptcy context .
. . . It is important in interpreting New Jersey law that the otherwise
worthy desire for achieving a reorganization under Chapter 11 should
not trump the rights of an assignee of a lease under a pre-petition
assignment. I 12
petition was filed; court noted that § 105 does not "constitute a roving commission to
do equity"); In re Charles & Lillian Brown's Hotel, Inc., 93 B.R. 49, 54 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y
1988) ("§ I 05(a) does not create substantive rights otherwise unavailable or grant the
bankruptcy court an unrestricted license to do equity").
/d. Not all of the cases involving whether a lease is a true lease or a secured loan view the
issue as one of state law. See, e.g., Olathe, Kansas v. KAR Dev. Assocs. L.P. (In re KAR Dev.
Assocs. L.P.), 180 B.R. 629 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1995), and cases cited therein. Whether state or
federal law should determine whether, in bankruptcy, a lease of real or personal property is
a true lease is beyond the scope of this Article. It is worth noting an important difference,
however, between a lease of property and a sale of a financial asset with recourse. If the lease
transaction is truly a secured loan, then the lessee's bankruptcy payments to the transferee
would be limited to the value of the collateral. See II US.C. §§ 506(a), I I 29(b) (1994). If the
lease is treated as a true lease, the lease itself, if assumed, would dictate the amount, timing,
and other terms of the payments regardless of the value of leased property. See id. §§ 365(a),
(b), I I 23(b)(2). This difference in treatment could create a windfall for a transferee clever
enough to disguise a loan as a lease. The recourse claim of the transferee of a financial asset,
on the other hand, would be entitled to full payment only if fully collateralized. Moreover,
the payment terms, unlike the terms of an assumed lease, could be restructured under a plan.
See id. § I I 29(b).
110. First Fidelity Bank, N.A. v. Jason Realty, L.P. (In re Jason Realty, L.P.), 59 F.3d 423
(3d Cir. 1995).
III. Id.at427.
112. /d. at 429-30; see Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 US. 197, 206 (1988)
("[W]hatever equitable powers remain in the bankruptcy courts must and can only be exercised within the confines of the Bankruptcy Code."); Kham & Nate's Shoes No.2, Inc. v.
First Bank, 908 F.2d 1351, 1361 (7th Cir. 1990) ("[B]ankruptcy judges no longer have equitable powers to modify contracts to achieve 'fair' distributions. Bankruptcy judges [now
must] enforce entitlements created under state law." (citing Butner v. United States, 400 US.
48 (1979)); Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Fin. Corp., 874 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir. 1989); Union Pac.
R.R. v. Moritz (In re Iowa R.R.), 840 F.2d 535 (7th Cir. 1988).
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In Jason Realty, the issue was whether, in an assignment of rents, the
assignee owned the rents or merely had a security interest in them. 113
Similar issues are raised in true sale cases involving financial assets. Although in those cases, too, bankruptcy courts might be tempted to rely
upon equity and ignore state law principles, whether a sale is a true sale
can only be answered by looking ultimately at state law and respecting
state law rights. To ignore state law rights and create a separate body of
federal common law instead would increase uncertainty-a consequence
of bad, not good, bankruptcy law. I 14 It also would undermine the law's
interest in preserving reasonable commercial expectations that insure efficiency and predictability in the marketplace. I IS

Recognizing Sales with Recourse for Collectibility
Pro7notes Efficiency and Predictability
Recognizing that one can have a true sale of financial assets even with
recourse for collectibility creates both transactional efficiency and predictability in the credit markets, and, as a result, lowers the cost of credit.
Transactions are more efficient because a seller is better able to assess the
risk of assets it originates and, as a result, can minimize the extent to which
it discounts the asset's sale price and thus maximize sale proceeds.
The reason why the seller will provide credit recourse is to maximize
her sale proceeds. As an example, suppose that an originator holds a
pool ofloans with a face amount of$l,OOO,OOO. She knows the credit
quality of the loans, and therefore she can predict a probable 1% loss
on this pool over the life of the loans. A potential buyer is not as
confident about the credit quality of the loans, and may be willing to
pay only 97 % of the face amount of the loans without any recourse.
He may, however, be willing to pay 100% if the seller guarantees that
he will suffer no losses from default. By providing this recourse, the
seller can receive $30,000 more in sale proceeds in exchange for a
contingent liability that she estimates will be 1%, or $10,000, over
113. Jason Realty, 59 E3d at 425.
114. See Butner, 440 U.S. at 55.

115. This does not mean that, unless a transaction actually violated state law, a bankruptcy
court could not recharacterize a sale as a loan. Obviously a "sale" with significant economic
recourse and no other material characteristics of a sale, even if not usurious or otherwise
illegal under state law, should nonetheless be recharacterized in bankruptcy. There is no
reason to respect the transaction as a sale in bankruptcy if recharacterizing it as a loan would
in any way facilitate a debtor's rehabilitation, so long as state law principles that generally
apply in recharacterization cases are applied in bankruptcy. This means recognizing that,
under state law, a buyer has the right to bargain for a sale with recourse for collectibility, and
it means enforcing his bargain in bankruptcy.
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the life of the loans. For accounting purposes, she will treat this transaction as a sale, and her sale proceeds will equal $990,000. 116
Transactions would become more predictable because buyers would not
have to wonder how much recourse is "too much" recourse and wed
themselves in every transaction to potentially more complicated and expensive two-tiered structures in order to accomplish a true sale. I 17
Creating efficiencies is good legal policy. I 18 In fact, the efficiency created
by permitting a sale of a financial asset with recourse for collectibility is
no different than that created when a seller gives a warranty of quality in
the sale of any asset. Virtually every type of asset sale is accompanied by
representations and warranties as to origin, quality, condition, and similar
attributes. Such warranties serve not only to assure the buyer that it will
receive what was bargained for, but also as a mechanism for allocating risk
when it is difficult or impossible for the buyer to ascertain certain facts.
For a transaction to be economically feasible, often the seller must allocate
these risks to itself
Each material term of a contract maximizes the expected value of
the contract by sharing risk, reducing risk, or allocating risk. ...
. . . [0] ne party may rationally accept all risk related to an event
if that party is in a position to prevent the risk and if the costs of
shifting the risk to the other party render further negotiation inefficient. 119
For example, the seller of real property previously used as a gas station
may represent and warrant to the buyer that the property is free and clear
of all environmental risks. It is a risk that the seller, who may have knowledge of the property's prior use over many years, is comfortable in assuming or, at least, is in a better position than the buyer to assess. Unless the
seller makes such warranty, the buyer may decide not to proceed.
Certain warranties of quality relating to accounts deal with the probability of default by third-party obligors. These types of warranties, which
allocate risk to the seller, are commonly accepted in securitized transactions and, to some extent, are surrogates for warranties of collectibility.
Take, for example, a seller that warrants to the buyer that all third-party
obligors on certain consumer receivables have met specified screening criteria. Typically, the seller would warrant that the underlying obligors will
satisfy certain underwriting standards, that the receivables do not exceed
116. Plank, supra note 5, at 305; see Robert D. Aicher & William]. Fellerhoff, Characterization
qf a Transfer qf Receivables as a Sale or a Secured Loan Upon Bankruptcy qf the Transferor, 65 AM.
BANKR. LJ. 181,209 (1991).
117. See irifra text accompanying notes 126-28.
118. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw (2d ed. 1977).
119. Laurie Fisher Humphrey, Difault Rules in the Guaranty Context, 42 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 1229, 1249-50 (1992).
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certain concentration limits, that the receivables are not subject to disputes,
setoffs, or other noncredit-related reductions, that the obligor has not previously defaulted on any receivable owing to the seller, and that other
eligibility criteria have been met. 120 If, however, the seller has not maintained uniform origination standards such that this warranty cannot be
given, will a warranty of collectibility automatically jeopardize the characterization of the transaction as a sale? The seller is in a much better
position than the buyer to assess risk and may be confident that risk will
be minimal. If the purchaser is not convinced, however, it may be unwilling
to proceed unless it receives a warranty of collectibility for all losses-or,
alternatively, unless the seller discounts the purchase price. The economic
effect and the necessity for the giving of a warranty of collectibility in that
situation would often be indistinguishable from a warranty of quality that
a seller of any asset would give and would permit the transaction and
encourage economic efficiency. It should not, per se, change the parties'
characterization of a transaction from a sale to a pledge. 121 To do so would
be to preclude otherwise economically efficient transactions from occurrmg.
Affording true sale treatment to a sale with recourse for collectibility
also promotes predictability. The law, including bankruptcy law, values
commercial predictability, encourages the free transferability of assets, and
recognizes the direct relationship between predictability and the cost of
credit. "[LJenders' expectations are central to the calculation of interest
rates and other terms ofloans, and fulfilling those expectations is therefore
important to the efficiency of credit markets."122
Commercial law requires legal certainty. Benjamin N. Cardozo's recognition of "the overmastering need of certainty in the transactions of
commercial life" is as apt today as it was over fifty years ago. 123 The need
for certainty is especially strong when it comes to the sale of financial assets.
These transactions occur as the result of planning, usually with the assistance of legal counsel. Risks accompanying the transactions are carefully
evaluated and are reflected in the price of the transaction. Any risk, including legal risk, will reduce the value of the asset to either party to the
120. Some try to distinguish these types of warranties from warranties of collectibility on
the theory that the former deals with risk arising from circumstances that existed prior to
sale, the latter with the future risk that the obligor will default. In many transactions that are
treated unquestionably as a sale, however, the seller warrants against certain types of future
risk. See Plank, supra note 5, at 339-43.
121. Id. at 343-46; Aicher & Fellerhoff, supra note 116, at 210. ("If the effective price paid
(accounting for all recourse, purchase price holdbacks, overcollateralization with a retained
seller interest and similar devices) reasonably approximates what a willing buyer would pay
a willing seller, the court should not decide that such recourse devices require characterization
of the transactions as a loan. ").
122. Union Say. Bank v. Augie/Restivo Baking Co. (In re Augie/Restivo Baking Co.), 860
F.2d 515, 519 (2d Cir. 1988).
123. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, GROWfH OF THE LAw 110 (1924).
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transaction. Although some legal uncertainty is, in all probability, unavoidable, unnecessary risk created by unnecessary uncertainty about the
law is simply an avoidable dead-weight loss to both sides of the deal.
"[1lhe policies of both contract and property law include creating certainty and predictability to reduce the parties' planning and transaction
costs." 124
The uncertainty caused by In re Twist Cap125 illustrates this problem.
There, the bankruptcy court temporarily enjoined payment under a letter
of credit issued prepetition to an unsecured creditor because the issuing
bank's contingent reimbursement obligation was secured, and, upon drawing, would have become fixed. This result was contrary to the understanding of most lawyers who had contemplated the matter, and almost all of
them thought that the implication in the case, that a payment under the
letter of credit might constitute a preference, was wrong. That belief could
not, however, counteract the doubt the case caused, and the uncertainty
it created has had substantial effects.
That case caused chaos in the markets where the parties depend upon
letters of credit. For example, the credit rating of bond issues sometimes depends upon a letter of credit backing those bonds from a
bank with stronger credit standing than the issuer. Mter Twist Cap,
issuers had difficulty getting a favorable rating for fear that a bankruptcy court might enjoin the bank from paying.... Elements of that
problem have persisted despite the fact that nearly every court that
has since considered the issue has held there is no preference.... 126
This confusion concerning the potential consequences in bankruptcy of
secured letters of credit resulted from a single decision by one trial judge.
Twist Cap illustrates the economic cost of unpredictable laws. In the securitization market, uncertainty over how much recourse is "too much" recourse and the concern that one cannot have a true sale with recourse for
collectibility creates unnecessary cost and uncertainty. Cardozo's lesson still
needs to be taught. In commercial matters, uncertainty is costly and courts
must do their utmost to minimize both its amount and degree.

MARKET APPLICATIONS
Many securitized transaction structures rely, to some extent, on recourse
to lower risk and thus lower the cost of credit. Unfortunately, because of
the existing confusion over recourse and true sale, the amount of recourse
124. Tamar Frankel, The Legal Inftastructure qf Markets: The Role qf Contract and Property Law,
73 B.U. L. REV. 389, 395 (1993).
125. Twist Cap, Inc. v. Southeast Bank (In re Twist Cap, Inc.), I B.R. 284 (Bankr. M.D.
Fla. 1979).
126. JAMESJ. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 23-4,
at 838-39 (4th ed. 1995).
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in these structures is often unnecessarily limited and is often the cause of
extensive, and unnecessary, debate and negotiation. The following are examples of actual or potentially useful market structures that, to varying
degrees, rely on collectibility recourse to lower credit cost. Although some
of these structures may go beyond where the market generally is today
because of existing concerns about recourse and true sale, they are all, in
the view of the authors, true sales despite the presence of collectibility
recourse.

Trade Receivables; Divisible Interest Structure
A company wishes to raise money by periodically selling its receivables
to an independent SPY. Assume in a given transaction that the company
will sell a batch of non-interest bearing receivables with an aggregate face
amount of $1,000,000. Assume also that the company has the ability to
make discrete sales of the receivables and identifY and track collections on
them (in order to avoid commingling concerns), and that the discounts are
negotiated at arms' length and are not subject to adjustments after the
purchase occurs. Such a sale might look like this:
Outstanding balance of receivables in batch
Yield discount (negotiated and fixed for each
purchase) [assume based on a 10%127 per annum
purchaser return, and a 60 day average maturity]
Servicer discount [payable to servicer] [assume based
on a 0.50% per annum]
Purchase Price = outstanding balance minus
discounts
Reserves/holdbacks for:
• defaults (greater of 3 times historical losses and 3
times concentrations) [assume 9%]
• Dilution [assume 15%]
Cash Purchase Price = Purchase Price minus
reserves/holdbacks

$1,000,000

$

16,667

$

833

$ 982,500

$ 90,000
$ 150,000
$ 742,500

This transaction would be a true sale under the theory of this Article.
The purchaser, by accepting a fixed yield discount for each purchase, is
taking the economic risk that the receivables may collect more slowly than
anticipated, and also is getting the potential upside in the event the payback is faster. The reserves taken for default and dilution will give the
buyer protection only for collection risk. They would not mitigate the
economic risk the buyer accepts as a result of the fixed discount. 128
127. This includes a profit factor. If the SPY funds itself in the capital markets, the yield
discount may well be lower.
128. See generally Schwarcz, supra note 7 (describing this structure in detail).
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This transaction structure would also dispense with the need for a twotier structure, reducing cost and complexity and therefore making it even
easier, in certain cases, to bring capital market-priced funding to companies-especially middle market companies.

Credit Card Receivables; Master Trust
In a second example, a bank 129 may wish to manage its financial ratios
or match fund its credit card receivables portfolio with liabilities with similar terms. The selling bank will identify a pool of credit card accounts,
pursuant to which receivables have been and will be generated. It will
transfer to a master trust all receivables generated and to be generated by
the identified accounts, which, in this example, at the time of transfer equal
approximately $1 million in principal amount. The purchasing trust will
pay cash equal to the face amount of the receivables for a portion of the
pool and will issue to the selling bank an undivided, minority interest in
the pool for the remainder of the pool. It will obtain the cash by selling A,
B, and C interests in the trust to third parties. A interests will be senior to
Band C interests, and B interests will be senior to C interests. The A
interests will equal 85% of the original pool, the B interests 5%, and the
C interests 10%, respectively. As old receivables collect, the collections will
be invested in newly generated receivables. If new receivables in excess of
available collections are generated, the seller's undivided interest in the
pool will increase to accommodate this fluctuation in the pool's size during
the reinvestment or "revolving" period. Similarly, the seller's interest will
decrease if collections exceed new receviables. The seller's interest will be
129. One might initially question whether the concept of a true sale is relevant for a
commercial bank. In rated securitizations, commercial banks, thrifts, and other depository
institutions are not required to effect true sales of their receivables; as a result, the typical
securitization by such an originator is a one-step sale of the receivables to a trust in which
the major focus is on the proper perfection of the trust's security interests in the receivables.
These types of sellers are granted this latitude because the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), which is the receiver for insolvent depository institutions and has the statutory power to delay foreclosures on property by secured creditors, 12 U.S.C. § 1821 (1994)
(roughly analogous to the automatic stay powers granted to a bankruptcy court), has indicated
that it will not use this power as a receiver to stay foreclosure on assets in which a creditor
has a properly perfected security interest, provided that certain additional conditions are met.
Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., Statement qf Policy on Foreclosure and Redemption Rights, 57 Fed. Reg.
29,491 (1992). The FDIC's right, however, to repudiate "burdensome" contracts to which a
failed depository institution is a party, 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(I) (1994), gives the FDIC the right
to, in effect, prepay the obligations secured by the receivables and retake possession of the
receivables. Such an action would prove harmful to investors in an environment in which
interest rates had fallen since the issuance of the securities in question because the investors
might not be able to reinvest their prepaid principal in comparably yielding investments.
Many lawyers, however, are of the opinion that the requirements of§ 1821(e)(I) do not apply
to true sales. [d. A transaction structure that consititued a one-step true sale, therefore, could
provide greater certainty to investors (and result in a savings to the selling bank) by reducing
the likelihood of prepayment upon an insolvency of the seller.
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on par with A's interest, but will not be entitled to bad debt protection
from the B or C interests. Because of the reinvestment of collections, the
seller will retain all collections on account of principal during the revolving
period. Mter the revolving period ends, the seller and other investors in
the trust will receive ratable portions of principal collections based on their
then respective individual interests in the trust. Liquidation of the portfolio
normally takes about ten months.
To protect against bad debts, holders of the C interests will make the A
and B interests whole to the extent of the C interests, and the B interests
will make the A interests whole to the extent of the B interests. Bad debts
will first, however, be covered by "excess spread."
Excess spread will be obtained from interest collections on transferred
receivables. The receivables will bear interest at a rate specified in the
charge account agreements, the rate of which will have a floor of not less
than 6% per annum. The actual return on the receivables pool will flutuate
based upon a variety of factors (such as the rate of charge-offs, deliquencies,
and payment rate). For purposes of this example, the return will be assumed to be 20% per annum. Yield will be distributed between holders of
A, B, and C interests based on the outstanding principal amount of their
respective investments and will only be paid to the extent interest collections are
actually received. The A interests will earn 5% per annum, the B interests 5.5%
per annum and the C in terests 6 % per annum. The bank, as servicer, will earn
2% per annum, and other fees and expenses will be about 1% per annum.
Bad debts have been running at 4% per annum.
Excess spread constitutes interest collections not otherwise allocated to
the A, B, and C interests or servicing fees or other expenses. The bank, as
seller, will be entitled to retain all interest collections not allocated to the
contracted-for return on the A, B, or C interests, servicing and other
fees, or to cover bad debts.
Finally it is assumed that $100,000 of principal collections will be obtained each month (and, by definition, $16,666.66 of interest collections
(1/12 of$200,000) (20% of$l ,000,000 = $200,000)). For simplicity's sake,
these calculations ignore the effects of compounding interest periods.
A monthly settlement prior to liquidation might look like this:
Total Cash flow:
Total Principal cash flow:
Total Interest cash flow:
Total Defaulted Receivables l30
A's share of interest (85 %)
A's share of defaults
A's net share of interest
A's share of servicing and other fees
A's accrued interest
A's excess interest
130. 4%

x $1,000,000 x

1/12 = $3,333.33

$116,666.66
lOO,OOO.OO
16,666.66
3,333.33
$ 14,166.66
2,833.33
11,333.33
2,124.92
3,54l.66
5,666.75
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B's share of interest (5 %)
B's share of defaults
B's net share of interest
B's share of servicing and other fees
B's accrued interest
B's excess interest

$

833.33
166.66
666.67
125.00
229.16
312.51

Cs share of interest (10%)
Cs share of defaults
Cs net share of interest
Cs share of servicing and other fees
Cs accrued interest
Cs excess interest

$

1,666.66
333.33
1,333.33
250.00
500.00
583.33

Total Defaults
Total Servicing and Other Fees
Total Accrued Interest
Total Excess Spread

$

3,333.33
2,499.92
4,270.82
6,562.59

Seller's share of Cash Flow
(other than on account of A's interest)
Principal
Excess Spread
Total

$100,000.00
6,562.59
$106,562.59

In this example, even though the protection for bad debts given to the
investors in the most senior interests equals a multiple of seven times historical experience and, to the most junior interests, three times historical
experience, I3l the transfer should constitute a true sale. Bad debt protection constitutes only credit recourse, and the investors depend for their
return entirely on yield accruing on the transferred assets, which yield is
based upon an interest rate which must, under the terms of the charge
account agreements, equal or exceed the return promised to investors. 132

Retail Automobile Receivables; One-tier Structure
In this example, a captive finance subsidiary of an automobile manufacturer wishes, for balance sheet purposes, to securitize $1,000,000 of auto
131. In this example, available spread after deducting accrued interest and other expenses
equals $9,520.84, or about three times loss experience (per month of $3,333.33), and the B
and C interests of $150,000 equal about four times loss experience (annualized of $40,000).
132. An interesting question would arise if the investors received a floating interest rate
not tied to the rate earned by the receivables, but payable solely from a cash flow generated
by the receivables (and thus, by definition, subject to a cap). As the return to the buyers
derive from the cash flow generated by the receivables, the floating rate return, one might
argue, should not constitute an impermissible amount of economic recourse and the transfer
should be a true sale. See supra notes 45, 47.
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retail installment contracts that bear a fixed rate of return equal to 9% per
annum. The investors, however, in the trust that is to purchase the receivables, wish to obtain a floating rate of return equal to the London Interbank offered rate or "Libor" plus 0.50% per annum on the notes to be
issued by the trust and Libor plus 0.75 % per annum on the certificates to
be issued by the trust (which on the proposed date of closing, equals 5.5%
and 5.75% per annum, respectively). Historical loss experience equals 1%
per annum of total collections and the pool has an expected weighted average
maturity of one and a half years.
The finance company seller wishes to sell the receivables to an owner
trust which will issue a senior class of notes with a principal amount equal
to 97 % of the face amount of the pool and a subordinated class of certificates with a principal amount equal to the remaining 3% of the face
amount of the pool. The finance company will also enhance the certificates
and the notes by pledging a cash collateral account equal to 5% of the
face amount of the pool. The interest collections on the receivables will,
as in the credit card example, be applied to pay the rate of return on the
trust notes and certificates, the servicing fee, and to cover bad debts; the
excess spread, if any remains, will be returned to the finance company.
The amount of bad debt protection, as discussed above, should not disqualifY the transfer from being a true sale. But what of the floating interest
rate, which does not match the yield on the underlying receivables, and,
if rates rise, may need to be paid out of the cash collateral account? Although this appears to be economic recourse, it would seem that so long
as the economics of the transaction are in substance the same as sale of a
fixed rate investment together with a separate, arm's-length sale of a swap,
the transaction should not be disqualified as a true sale.

Retail Automobile Receivables; Two-Tier Structure
Assume that the parties to the above transaction wished to structure the
transaction using a two-tier structure. The seller would transfer the receivables from itself to a wholly owned SPY and the SPY would transfer
them to an owner trust. The transfer to the SPY, which would constitute
a true sale, would be extremely simple:
Outstanding auto receivables
Contribution of receivables to Spy
Sale of receivables to Spy for purchase price equal to
face amount of receivables

$1,000,000
70,000
930,000

The SPY would earn whatever return the receivables themselves earned
and the transfer would therefore clearly be a true sale (even if the receivables were to earn a floating rate of interest). The Spy could then sell the
receivables to the owner trust for $1,000,000 and pledge a portion of the
$70,000 obtained from the trust (which it will not need to pay the finance
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company seller as purchase price) in the cash collateral account to cover
bad debt and interest rate risk.
According to this Article, this transaction could be enhanced with one
additional feature: full collectibility recourse against the seller for all defaulted receivables. This right of recourse would be assigned by the SPY
to the owner trust as additional credit support for the sold receivables.
Under the theory of this Article, full collectibility recourse would be completely consistent with the concept of true sale.

CONCLUSION
To analyze whether the recourse that a seller of financial assets gives to
a buyer converts a sale into a loan, one must distinguish between collectibility recourse and economic recourse. This Article shows that the question of sale versus loan is one of state law, even in bankruptcy, and so long
as recourse is limited to collectibility, there should be no legal reason why
the recourse should convert the sale into a loan.

